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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Labor Market Impact of China’s Higher Education Expansion Reform
by
Yun Feng
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019
Professor Moshe Buchinsky, Chair
This dissertation studies the effects of China’s higher education expansion reform on workers’
labor market outcomes.
In Chapter 1, I investigate how China’s higher education expansion reform affects young
workers’ labor market outcomes. Using data from the 2005 China Population Survey, I
estimate the effects of the reform using a diff-in-diff type of framework. The key variation I
use for identification is province-specific cohort-to-cohort variation in the expansion intensity.
I find that the reform does not increase unemployment but reduces labor force participation
for young workers. In the meantime, the reform increases the likelihood of getting a graduate
degree, which partly explains why it decreases labor force participation. Similar results are
obtained for college cohorts using IV.
In Chapter 2, I aim to address the caveats embedded in the empirical strategy in Chapter
1. To do so, I construct and structurally estimate a dynamic discrete choice labor market
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general equilibrium model, and innovate in modeling and estimation by incorporating the
college admissions policy of China. Unlike in Chapter 1, this approach allows one to generate
counterfactuals and policy simulations while taking into account the general equilibrium
effects of the reform. After structurally estimating the model, I show that it matches key
data moments reasonably well.
In Chapter 3, I examine the effects of China’s higher education expansion reform on the
evolution of the college wage premium. I show that the reform interacts with the demo-
graphics of workers and affects them differentially. Using the model developed in Chapter
2, I find that in the presence of post-reform technological progress, the reform first increases
and then decreases the college wage premium. In its absence, however, the reform decreases
the college wage premium from the start. I also find that in the latter case, workers induced
to go to college by the reform (compliers) gain the most on average, whereas those who go
to college with or without it (always-takers) lose the most, because the large increase in the
supply of high-skill labor depresses skill prices. Policy experiments are conducted to show,
if China were to continue with the expansion, how long it would take for it to reach the
average share of high-skill workers in developed countries.
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Chapter 1
The Short-run Effects of the Higher
Education Expansion in China on
Young Workers’ Labor Market
Outcomes
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1.1 Introduction
In 1999, China implemented a higher education expansion reform, and started to rapidly
increase college admissions in order to fulfill the expected increasing demand for college
workers. Before 1999, the number of new college students admitted each year was no more
than 1 million. In 1999, this number increased to around 1.5 million and continued to
grow. It reached about 7 million in 2013. During the higher education expansion, the
college admission rate also increased sharply. The average college admission rate was only
31.6% between 1990 and 1998, which became 63.4% between 1999 and 2013, more than 30
percentage points higher.
In the presence of such a massive reform, one might think that the unemployment rate
of young college workers would increase in the short run if the demand for college workers
doesn’t catch up. There are quite a few papers documenting the unemployment patterns
of college graduates (see Li et al. (2014); He and Mai (2014); Bai (2006) among others).
In particular, the unemployment rate of new college graduates for the period 2007–2011
was documented at over 10% (He and Mai (2014)). Meng (2012) argued that the main
factor contributing to this was the rapid expansion of higher education. However, how much
of the unemployment of young workers can be attributed to the reform requires careful
investigation.
In this chapter, I assess the higher education expansion reform’s effects on the labor
market outcomes of young high school and college graduates in the short run. Using the
1% sample of the 2005 China Population Survey data, I first document the unemployment
patterns of young high school and college graduates who are of age 22-28. I find that
unemployment decreases in age.
In order to understand whether the higher education expansion reform increases unem-
ployment rate for young workers, I adopt a diff-in-diff type of empirical strategy, and exploit
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the province-specific cohort-to-cohort variation in the expansion intensity of the reform. To
measure the expansion intensity, I use the ratio of the number of admitted college students
in a given province and the total number of registered College Entrance Exam takers in that
province. In the baseline, I pool the cohorts that were directly affected by the reform, for
which I am able to observe labor market outcomes in the data, and compare them with the
rest of the cohorts in the sample. I find that the reform doesn’t seem to increase unem-
ployment for young workers, but it decreases labor force participation. In particular, a 0.1
increase in the expansion intensity leads to a 0.007 increase in the likelihood of not being in
the labor force.
Since pooling cohorts together may mask some interesting variation, I employ a more
saturated specification to estimate the reform’s effects for each treated cohort individually.
Similar to the results for the pooled cohorts, I find that the expansion reform does not increase
unemployment but reduces labor force participation for younger workers. In the meantime,
the reform increases the likelihood of getting a graduate degree, which partly explains why it
decreases labor force participation. By allowing more people to go to college, the reform also
makes graduate studies more accessible. Some college graduates find it optimal to pursue
graduate school, and therefore postpone entering the labor market. I also find that the
reform decreases the likelihood of becoming a white collar worker. One reason for this is
that by allowing more people to go to college, the reform lowers the ability cutoff of college
admissions. Thus, it may be difficult for less able college graduates to find a white collar
job. To investigate the effects of the expansion reform on college degree holders alone, I also
construct IVs as the interactions between cohort dummies and the expansion intensity that
a cohort receives and obtain similar findings.
3
Related Literature
This chapter is most closely related to Li et al. (2014).1 They use data from the China
Population Survey conducted in 2000 and 2005, and showed that the expansion reform
increased the unemployment rate of young college graduates. They exploit the pooled-cohort-
specific time-to-time variation (from 2000 to 2005) to estimate the effect of the reform. In
contrast, this chapter makes use of the geographical variation of the expansion’s intensity, and
exploits the province-specific cohort-to-cohort variation in the reform’s intensity. In addition
to estimating the reform’s effects for the pooled treated cohorts, this chapter also examines
the effects for each treated cohort individually. Controlling for cohort differences and region
differences allows me to partial out more confounding variation and obtain different results
on the reform’s effects. In terms of empirical strategy, this chapter is also related to Duflo
(2001). She examined the effects of a school construction program in Indonesia on education
attainment and wages using a comprehensive cross section.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the institutional
background of the higher education expansion reform. Section 1.3 describes the data and lays
out preliminary evidence. Section 1.4 presents baseline empirical specifications and results
for the effects on the pooled treated cohorts. Section 1.5 presents results for treated cohorts
individually. Section 1.6 shows the effects of the reform on college degree holders. Section
1.7 concludes.
1For other related papers on China’s higher education expansion, please see Bai (2006), Meng (2012),
Meng et al. (2013) and He and Mai (2014) among others.
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1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 The Higher Education Expansion Reform
The Chinese economy was growing rapidly in the 1990s. So was the demand for college-
educated workers. However, before the higher education expansion reform was implemented
in 1999, college admissions were low both in terms of the newly admitted students each year
and the admission rate. Before 1999, the number of newly admitted college students was
mostly less than 1 million (Figure 1.1). The average college admission rate is only 31.6%
between 1990 and 1998 (Figure 1.2). Increasing the supply of college-educated workers
was the main motivation behind the higher education expansion. At the time, the gross
college enrollment rate (GER) among Chinese youths was far below the average rate of
developed countries. The authorities hoped that carrying out the expansion would help
China narrow this gap. In addition, anecdotally, the 1997 financial crisis, which affected
many Asian economies, was documented to have pushed the authorities to expand college
admissions. The authorities believed that allowing more high school graduates to go to
college would postpone their entering the labor market, and could therefore reduce potential
unemployment due to the sluggish labor demand.
The higher education expansion reform increased both the number of college admissions
and the admission rate. Compared to 1998, the number of newly admitted college students
in 1999 increased from about 1 million to 1.5 million. It then kept increasing and reached
about 7 million in 2013. The average admission rate after 1999 is about 63.4% (Figure 1.2),
more than 30 percentage points higher than that in the 1990s. In addition to increasing
admissions, China also started to build more higher education institutions after 1999. The
number of such institutions increased from 1071 in 1999 to 1867 in 2006 and reached 2491
in 2013.
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1.2.2 The College Entrance Exam
China’s College Entrance Examination (CEE) is quite different from the U.S. The exam
takes place once a year and is organized at the province level. Students are required to
take the CEE in their provinces of Hukou registration. Moreover, the Ministry of Education
won’t release information on how many people it planned to admit until several months after
the registration for the CEE is complete. After taking the CEE, each student is allowed to
submit a list of universities ranked in the order of preference. For people who take the
CEE, admission is solely based on their CEE scores.2 Hence, in each province, high school
graduates only compete with their peers in the same province based on their score of CEE.
The Ministry of Education increases college admissions primarily through increasing the
admissions quota.3 To determine the quota, every year, the Ministry of Education collects
information on the capacity of all the universities in each province to make sure there will be
enough seats to hold the extra number of people admitted.4 Each province will get assigned
a quota by the Ministry of Education. Since the number of universities varies a lot across
provinces, there is a lot of variation in the admissions quota across provinces.
1.3 The Data and Preliminary Evidence
1.3.1 Description of the Data
The data set used in this chapter is the 1% sample of China’s 2005 Population Survey. This
survey was conducted by the Bureau of Statistics in China in November, 2005. It covers both
rural and urban areas in all 31 provinces in mainland China. The design and purpose of this
2People are only allowed to take the CEE after graduation from high school. So the majority of people
take CEE only when they first graduate from high school.
3The admissions quota works as a capacity constraint, which determines the maximum number of people
who are allowed to be admitted to college each year.
4The provinces here include four municipal cities: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.
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survey are similar to the Current Population Survey in the U.S. The Bureau of Statistics
in China conducts population census every decade starting from 1990, and does population
surveys in the middle of each decade. The 2005 Population survey covers key information
on demographics and labor market outcomes. It is the most representative micro data one
can obtain at the time when this chapter is written, and is suitable for evaluating the labor
market effects of the higher education expansion reform.
Based on one’s province of Hukou registration, I also link these data with provincial data
on the number of college admissions and the number of students registering for the CEE each
year.5 The ratio of college admissions and CEE registration will later be used as a measure
for the intensity of the higher education expansion in each province.
The original sample of 2005 population survey has 2,585,481 observations. This chapter
only focuses on high school graduates because they are the ones who are directly exposed
to the higher education expansion reform. I drop people whose education attainment is
below high school.6To focus on the labor market outcomes of young college graduates, only
people who were 22 to 28 years old in 2005 are kept. These age groups correspond to cohorts
graduated from high school between 1995 to 2001. It takes four years to graduate from a
(4-year) college, so the cohort graduated from high school in 2001 is the youngest cohort
we are able to examine. There are two other reasons for dropping people who were older
than 28. First, this keeps the number of people who were directly affected by the reform
similar to those who were not. Moreover, the Compulsory Schooling Law was carried out in
mid-1980s, which aims to ensure nine years of education for everyone.7 I would like to make
sure to exclude cohorts that were not affected by it such that the cohorts in comparison are
as similar as possible in that respect. Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for the key
5Hukou is the registration system in China recording a person’s registered location, which is typically
one’s place of birth.
6High school dropouts and students who didn’t get a degree were also dropped. They account for less
than 2% of the number of people with highest education attainment of the high school level.
7Nine years of education includes elementary school and junior high.
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individual level outcomes and control variables that I use in the chapter. 77320 observations
are left after sample selection. Table 1.1 shows that the shares of college degree and graduate
degree holders increase for younger workers.8 Meanwhile, the fractions of unemployed and
those who are not in the labor force decrease in age.
1.3.2 Preliminary Evidence
Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 provide suggestive evidence on the relationship between the higher
education expansion and the labor market outcomes of young workers. Figure 1.3 suggests
that the fraction of people who have a college degree decreases in age, which means the later
one graduates, the more likely one is a college graduate. This is obvious since the higher
education expansion reform increases college admissions each year. It’s worth noting that
Age 25 corresponds to the first cohort affected by the reform, and that is where the changing
trend starts to become more obvious.9 Moreover, the fraction of graduate degree holders
decreases in age and the slope seems to become steeper and steeper. This suggests that
the higher education expansion may also affect the probability of going to graduate school,
which I examine later.
Figure 1.4 shows that young workers are more likely to be unemployed, not in the labor
force, and are less likely to be white-collar workers. However, such differences between
cohorts cannot be solely attributed to the reform, because each cohort was at a different
point in the life cycle. There are cohort differences such as different accumulation of labor
market experience due to different timing of entering the market. Nonetheless, we do see
the slopes become steeper, which suggests that there may be some effects induced by the
reform.
8College degree here includes 2-year college. I do so because one with a 2-year college degree is typically
counted as a high skill worker in the literature.
9The majority of students are 18 or 19 years old when they graduate from high school.
8
1.4 The Effects on the Pooled High School Cohorts Ex-
posed to the Expansion
1.4.1 Baseline Specification
Since the majority of people who register for the College Entrance Exam (CEE) holds a high
school degree, this chapter only focuses on high school graduates. Most of the exam takers
are high school students who are about to graduate in the year of the exam.10 Since the 2005
Population Survey does not provide information on the year one took the CEE, I assume all
high school graduates who want to go to college take the CEE at Age 18.11 Based on this
assumption, people who were between 22-24 in 2005 should have graduated from high school
between 1999 and 2001. They were all exposed to the expansion reform whether or not they
ended up going to college. In this section, I pool these cohorts together to be the treatment
group. This helps us to get a baseline effect of the reform, and it is less sensitive to the
assumption that everyone took the CEE at Age 18. Direct comparison between cohorts that
were directly affected by the reform and those who did not will yield a combination of the
reform’s effect and cohort differences. In order to identify the effect, we also need variation
across provinces in the intensity of the reform. Within each province, there is variation in
the exposure to the reform across cohorts. Hence, the identification of the reform’s effect
on young workers’ labor market outcomes will come from province-specific cohort-to-cohort
variation in the intensity of the reform.
There’s substantial variation across provinces in college admissions. As is mentioned in
Section 1.2, each year, the Ministry of Education collects information on the capacity of all
universities across the 31 provinces, including 4 municipal cities, and allocates admission
10This fraction is 82% based on data in the 2010 Education Statistics Yearbook.
11The Education Statistics Yearbook records information on the age distribution of applicants registering
the CEE. It’s roughly the same across years. 11% of them are under 18. 0.1% are above 25. The rest are in
between.
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quotas to all the provinces. Since the number of university seats and CEE exam takers vary
a lot across provinces, there is variation in the college admission rate. To the extent that
the college admission rate measures how difficult it is to be admitted to a college, it can be
used as a measure of the intensity of the expansion reform.
Conditional on the same population, increasing the admission rate can be viewed as
lowering the ability cutoff of going to college. The college admission rate in one province is
defined as the admitted students in that province divided by the number of people registering
for the CEE. Although in the presence of the higher education expansion, middle school
students may be more likely to go to high school and the number of people registering for
the CEE may increase, it remains relatively fixed at around three million for the cohorts that
I examine. This is because all three treated cohorts (who were 22-24 in 2005) were already
in high school when the expansion took place in June, 1999.12 As a result, the three treated
cohorts should not be very different in terms of the distribution of ability.
To construct a measure of expansion intensity, I use data on the number of people reg-
istering for the CEE by year and province. Unfortunately, after exhaustive search, I find
it extremely difficult to obtain data on the number of admitted college students who take
the CEE in the same province. Instead, I use the number of students who are admitted to
colleges in each province, which is available in the statistics yearbook.13 This measure of
expansion intensity I use is:
ExpanIntensity =
No. of Newly Admitted College Students
No. of People Registering for the CEE
Although people are free to choose to go to college outside their province, a large fraction
12Although people may seek to move to provinces with higher expansion intensity to increase the proba-
bility of getting into college for their kids, it is unlikely to happen in the short run. Since this chapter focuses
on the short-run effect of the reform, it’s reasonable to assume the ability distribution of exam takers in each
province is relatively fixed and won’t change as a result of the expansion intensity.
13This number includes people from all over the country, who applied for and were successfully admitted
to the institutions in a given province.
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of them choose to stay, especially in East China, where provinces are more developed.14 Also,
most people migrate back and enter the labor market in their registered province (where they
took the CEE).15 Hence, this measure not only affects their probability of getting into college,
and therefore their labor market outcomes, but can also affect their labor market outcomes.
Using both the cohort dimension and the province dimension, we can employ a difference-in-
difference approach to obtain baseline estimates of the effects of the expansion. The baseline
specification is as follows:
yicp = α + cohortc + provincep + βExpanIntensityp × dic + θXicp + ϵicp
y is the labor market outcome of individual i whose province of hukou registration status
was p. c indicates the year when i graduated from high school. In this specification, c
takes two values, either treated (if i graduated from high school between 1999 and 2001)
or untreated (if i graduated from high school between 1995 and 1998).16 ExpanIntensityp
is the intensity of the expansion reform in province p. In this baseline specification, the
intensity of the expansion reform equals to its 1999-2001 average for each province. dic is
an indicator equals to one if individual i belongs to cohort c. Xicp is a vector of individual
level controls. provincep and cohortc represent province fixed effects and cohort fixed effects,
respectively. β is the parameter of interest.
There is some concern regarding this specification that needs to be discussed. First, the
expansion intensity is not randomly assigned. The Ministry of Education may assign higher
quotas to provinces that need more. This measure may be correlated with province level
higher education investment, school construction etc. Once we control for province fixed
14There’s anecdotal evidence that suggests most students in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai stay even
if they can go to a better college in another province.
15Only 13.8% people in my sample worked in a different province from their registered one.
16In China, because of the restriction of hukou, high school graduates are required to take CEE in the
province of residential registration. For convenience, I refer to a cohort by its year of graduation from high
school. For example, Cohort 95 graduated from high school in 1995 and reached age 28 in 2005; Cohort 01
graduated from high school in 2001 and reached age 22 in 2005. The treated cohorts are Cohort 99 through
Cohort 01.
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effects, this concern can be partially addressed. However, this cannot address time-varying
trends in quotas, education investment, school construction that are province-specific. Sec-
ond, regarding migration, since every student is required to take CEE in province of reg-
istration and this is exogenous, it’s not likely to pose any problems. This is because, once
conditioning on province of registration, we are using the “correct” within province variation.
Third, although identification primarily relies on province-specific cohort to cohort variation,
it still helps to improve precision by adding individual level variables that vary by cohort.
1.4.2 Results
I estimate the baseline specification for four different labor market outcomes such as the
probability of getting a college degree, being unemployed, not being in the labor force, and
log monthly wages. The individual level controls are gender, belonging to the Han people
and hukou registration status. Control groups vary from the 95-98 pooled cohort to Cohort
98 alone. I vary the control groups in this way because there was a labor market reform that
took place in 1997, and it’s useful to vary the control groups as a robustness check.
The results are presented in Table 1.2 and 1.3. The results suggest that without indi-
vidual level controls, compared to 95-98 cohort, a 0.1 increase in the expansion intensity
would lead to a 0.001 increase in the likelihood of getting a college degree for the pooled
99-01 cohort. The effect is almost tripled when Cohort 98 is used as the control group. Un-
employment doesn’t seem to vary with expansion intensity, while labor force participation
does. With individual level controls, a 0.1 increase in intensity leads to a 0.007 increase
in the likelihood of not in the labor force comparing to 95-98 cohort. The effect decreases
by roughly 30% if comparing to 98 cohort alone. A 0.1 increase in intensity also decreases
wages by 0.4%. comparing to 98 cohort. Pooling cohorts together may mask some inter-
esting variation. Particularly, although people graduated from high school before 1999 were
not directly affected by the expansion, there could be spillover effects due to competition
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with the treated cohorts in the labor market. To the extent that workers of different ages
with the same level of education are imperfect substitutes due to differences in work expe-
rience, we might expect this spillover effect to be decreasing in age. The effects on labor
force participation seem to support this, but others are not. It’s worth separating different
cohorts and estimating the effects for each cohort individually.
1.5 The Effects of the Expansion on High School Co-
horts
1.5.1 Specification
Section 1.4 provides estimates for the average effects of the higher education expansion
reform. In this section, I examine the heterogeneous effects of the reform on high school
cohorts. The specification is modified based on that in Section 1.4.
yicp = α + cohortc + provincep +
2001∑
c=1996
βc (ExpanIntensityp × dic) + θXicp + ϵicp
c indicates an individual i’s graduation year from high school. One nice feature of this
specification is that it provides us with placebo tests. In the regression, the only cohort
excluded is Cohort 95, which serves as a control group. Since Cohort 95 through Cohort
98 were not directly affected by the expansion, conditional on cohort effects, their outcomes
shouldn’t be significantly affected by the expansion intensity. However, as is mentioned in
Section 1.4, there could be spillover effects due to competition with cohorts that were directly
affected. If workers of different ages but with the same education are imperfect substitutes,
we might expect the spillover effect to be decreasing in age. I estimate this specification for
five different outcomes such as the probability of being unemployed, not being in the labor
13
force, log monthly wages, getting a graduate degree and getting a white collar job.
1.5.2 Results
The results are presented in Table 1.4 and 1.5. For each outcome, I estimate the model
twice using Cohort 95 and Cohort 98 as control groups, respectively. From Table 1.4, we
can see that all cohorts except for Cohort 01 are very similar to Cohort 95. Comparing to
Cohort 98 as a double check, I find that in general, the expansion does not seem to lead to an
increase in unemployment. On the other hand, it’s quite robust that the expansion reduces
labor force participation and the effect is decreasing in age. From column (3), we can see
that Cohort 96 and 97 are not significantly different from Cohort 95, which is consistent
with our expectation for the placebo test. Interestingly, Cohort 98 picks up some effect.
One potential explanation is that Cohort 98 had to compete with some new graduates in
Cohort 99 and was therefore affected by the expansion. This is based on the hypothesis that
different age groups are imperfect substitutes in terms of human capital due to differences
in the accumulation of work experience. If this is true, then it would be more difficult for
the older cohorts to be substituted by new graduates, and the competition “spillover” effect
should be decreasing in age. The fact that Cohort 97 and Cohort 96 pick up no effects may
be due to this reason. However, we cannot rule out other potential explanations without
further examination.17
Combining the results from Table 1.4 and Section 1.4, we can see that the expansion in
general has no significant impact on unemployment but decreases labor force participation.
To understand why the expansion decreases labor force participation, I run another two
sets of regressions. The results are reported in Table 1.5. It shows that as the expansion
intensity increases, the likelihood of getting a graduate degree increases and that of getting
17Another potential explanation is that some people in Cohort 98 took the CEE with Cohort 99 and
were directly affected by the expansion. However, it hard to examine this hypothesis without more detailed
information on when one took the CEE.
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a white collar job decreases. The first result partially explains why the expansion decreases
labor force participation. The expansion allows more people to go to college and makes
graduate education more accessible to them. For some people, the future option value of
pursuing graduate education may exceed that of working immediately. They therefore choose
to postpone entering the labor force. The other set of results suggest that the likelihood of
becoming a white collar worker in general increases in age. One possible explanation is that
the expansion reform allows more people to go to college and lowers the ability cutoff college
admissions. Some less able college graduates may not be able to find a white collar job and
have to accept a blue collar job as time goes by.
One drawback of the diff-in-diff strategy is that we can only estimate the effects for people
who have at least a high school degree as a whole.18 This masks some interesting patterns
among college students. I will address this in the next section.
1.6 The Effects of the Expansion on College Cohorts
1.6.1 Specification
To investigate the effects of the expansion on college degree holders alone, we need to employ
a different empirical strategy. The specification I choose is:
yicp = α + cohortc + provincep + βcollegeicp +
2001∑
c=1996
γccollegeicp × dic + θXicp + ϵicp
The notation is the same as before. After estimating this model, we can get the differ-
ential impact on the outcomes for college degree holders who are of different cohorts. What
poses identification challenge is that college and the interaction terms are endogenous be-
18College is a choice variable and also an outcome of expansion. Doing diff-in-diff with only college
graduates is wrong.
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cause going to college is not choice randomly made across individuals. Since the education
expansion starting from 1999 is not correlated with individual level variables, we can exploit
the plausibly exogenous variation generated by the expansion reform. In particular, I con-
struct IVs as the interactions between cohort dummies and the expansion intensity that a
cohort receives. The idea is that the bigger the intensity was, the more likely an individ-
ual graduated from high school after 1999 was going to college. This is already an result
established in Section 1.4. In order for the IVs to be valid, we also need to make sure the
exclusion restriction is satisfied. That is, our IV should be uncorrelated with ϵicp conditional
on the covariates. Also, it should only affect the labor market outcomes through going to
college. Conditional on province and cohort fixed effects, the interactions between the cohort
dummies and the expansion intensity are obviously uncorrelated with ϵicp, since for a given
cohort in a given province, the interaction term is just a constant. The expansion intensity
is determined by the Ministry of Education based on predetermined province level variables
such as the number of available seats in universities. Conditional on province and cohort
fixed effects, it has no direct connection with a person’s labor market outcomes. It affects
the labor market outcomes by changing the relative difficulty of one going to college. Hence,
it is reasonable to think that the IVs satisfy the exclusion restriction.
1.6.2 Results
I estimate the model using both the pooled cohorts 99-01 and individual cohorts (Cohort
96 through Cohort 01). The Results are presented in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7. First-stage
F-statistics are reported. As we can see, all F-statistics are bigger than 10, which indicates
that our IV is strong. It’s worth noting that clustering standard errors to the province level
is crucial and affects the F-statistics. The coefficients of interest are the γ′cs. Conditional
on going to college and cohort fixed effect (also individual level controls), the likelihood of
being a white collar worker, the likelihood of being in the labor force and wage all increase in
16
age.19 More importantly, the magnitude of the effect on white collar is 6 times bigger than
what we get in Section 1.5. The magnitude of the effect on labor force participation and
log monthly wages are 5 and 3 times bigger, respectively. Note that there’s no significant
impact on unemployment in any of the cases. From (4), we see that the return to college
education decreases more and more for people in younger cohort. However, the return is still
positive, so we would expect the number of people going to college continues to grow, which
is consistent with the reality.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter studies the effects of China’s higher education expansion reform on young
workers’ labor market outcomes in the short run. Using the 1% sample of the 2005 China
Population Survey data, I first document that unemployment decreases in age for the cohorts
who were of age 22-28 in 2005. In order to estimate the effects of the higher education
expansion reform on the unemployment probability of young workers, I exploit the province-
specific cohort-to-cohort variation in the expansion intensity of the reform. I find that
the unemployment pattern of young cohorts affected by the expansion is not significantly
different from that of the older cohorts who were untreated. However, the reform decreases
labor force participation for the cohorts graduated from high school after 1999. In addition,
as the expansion intensity increases, the likelihood of getting a graduate degree increases
and that of getting a white collar job decreases. The findings are similar when I examine
the reform’s effects on college students using an IV strategy.
19Conditional on cohort fixed effects, this estimate should not be confounded by cohort differences such
as age and labor market experience.
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Figure 1.1: Annual High-School Graduates, Admitted College Students and College
Graduates
Notes: This figure shows the time series of the annual high school graduates, admitted college
students, college graduates. Both two- and four-year college students are included. The data used
are collected from the China Education Statistical Yearbooks.
18
Figure 1.2: Annual College Admission Rate
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the annual college admission rate from 1985 to 2014 (both
2- and 4-year colleges are included). The admission rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of
admitted students and the number of people who register for the College Entrance Exam (CEE)
each year. The data used are from the China Education Statistical Yearbooks.
19
Figure 1.3: Education Shares by Age
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of different degree holders by age. The data used are from
the 1% sample of the 2005 China Population Survey.
20
Figure 1.4: Shares by Labor Market Status and Age
Notes: This figure shows the worker’s shares by labor market status and age. The data used are
from the 1% sample of the 2005 China Population Survey.
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Table 1.3: The Effects on the Pooled High School Cohorts Exposed to the Expansion
(Continued)
Log Monthly Wage Log Monthly Wage
(1) (2)
Graduated from HS between 99 and 01*Average Intensity -0.102 -0.0370*
(0.009) (0.003)
Individual Level Controls Yes Yes
Adjusted R-square 0.221 0.214
Control Group HS Cohorts 95-98 HS Cohort 98
No. of Observations 60673 33786
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by cohort.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Notes: This table shows the reform’s effects on the pooled treated high school cohorts. Average intensity is the
average expansion intensity across treated cohorts. ExpanIntensity = No. of Newly Admitted College StudentsNo. of People Registering for the CEE .
The individual level controls are gender, belonging to the Han people and hukou registration status.
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Table 1.4: The Effects of the Expansion on High School Cohorts
Unemployment Not In the Labor Force Log Monthly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Graduated from HS in 01*Intensity 0.0165* 0.00304 0.133*** 0.0869*** -0.154* -0.0701**
(0.00625) (0.00327) (0.01293) (0.00354) (0.05) (0.00914)
Graduated from HS in 00*Intensity 0.00438 -0.0117 0.0956*** 0.0469*** -0.11 -0.0273*
(0.00644) (0.00368) (0.01532) (0.00089) (0.05288) (0.007)
Graduated from HS in 99*Intensity 0.00203 -0.0126* 0.0568* 0.0123** -0.0804 0.00384
(0.00597) (0.00333) (0.01548) (0.00202) (0.05255) (0.00768)
Graduated from HS in 98*Intensity 0.00981 0.0566* -0.0803
(0.00727) (0.0185) (0.06225)
Graduated from HS in 97*Intensity -0.00458 0.0334 -0.00462
(0.00684) (0.01758) (0.05775)
Graduated from HS in 96*Intensity -0.00186 0.0245 0.0221
(0.00531) (0.01283) (0.04333)
Individual Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adjusted R-square 0.02 0.022 0.054 0.052 0.225 0.217
Control Group HS Cohort 95 HS Cohort 98 HS Cohort 95 HS Cohort 98 HS Cohort 95 HS Cohort 98
No. of Observations 65549 37884 75864 45412 59582 33786
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by cohort.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Notes: This table shows the reform’s effects on treated high school cohorts individually. Intensity is calculated in the following
way: ExpanIntensity = No. of Newly Admitted College Students
No. of People Registering for the CEE
. The individual level controls are gender, belonging to the
Han people and hukou registration status. Individuals are classified as unemployed if they don’t have a job and were actively
searching for a job in the last three months. They are classified as not in the labor force if they are still at school or retired
early or haven’t searched for a job for more than three months.
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Table 1.5: The Effects of the Expansion on High School Cohorts (Continued)
Graduate Degree White Collar
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Graduated from HS in 01*Intensity 0.0665** 0.0579*** -0.0458*** -0.0309*
(0.01443) (0.00227) (0.0066) (0.00561)
Graduated from HS in 00*Intensity 0.0338 0.0246*** -0.0242** -0.00771
(0.01657) (0.001) (0.00603) (0.0038)
Graduated from HS in 99*Intensity 0.0159 0.00876* -0.0336*** -0.0173**
(0.01728) (0.00239) (0.00505) (0.00229)
Graduated from HS in 98*Intensity 0.0128 -0.0202*
(0.02065) (0.00572)
Graduated from HS in 97*Intensity 0.0159 -0.00694
(0.01916) (0.00503)
Graduated from HS in 96*Intensity 0.0224 0.00165
(0.01436) (0.00423)
Individual Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-square 0.054 0.054 0.07 0.066
Control Group HS Cohort 95 HS Cohort 98 HS Cohort 95 HS Cohort 98
No. of Observations 75864 77320 75864 45412
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by cohort.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Notes: This table shows the reform’s effects on treated high school cohorts individually. Intensity is calculated
in the following way: ExpanIntensity = No. of Newly Admitted College StudentsNo. of People Registering for the CEE . The individual level controls
are gender, belonging to the Han people and hukou registration status.
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Table 1.6: The Effects of the Expansion on College Cohorts
Unemployment Log Monthly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
College -0.0476 -0.0526 0.793*** 0.697***
(0.04212) (0.05208) (0.10983) (0.1394)
Graduated from HS between 99 and 01*College 0.0443 -0.428***
(0.03786) (0.10542)
Graduated from HS in 01*College 0.0802 -0.419**
(0.05648) (0.15181)
Graduated from HS in 00*College 0.0439 -0.373**
(0.05354) (0.14237)
Graduated from HS in 99*College 0.0294 -0.312*
(0.05158) (0.14118)
Graduated from HS in 98*College 0.00885 -0.291*
(0.05206) (0.14697)
Graduated from HS in 97*College -0.00286 -0.268
(0.0572) (0.14486)
Graduated from HS in 96*College -0.0111 -0.254
(0.05045) (0.14111)
Individual Level Controls YES YES YES YES
1st-stage F-statistic 38.9578 12.8913 35.8004 15.0631
Adjusted R-square 0.023 0.025 0.245 0.281
Control Group HS Cohorts 95-98 HS Cohorts 95 HS Cohorts 95-98 HS Cohorts 95
No. of Observations 66804 65549 61112 60008
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by cohort.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Notes: This table shows the reform’s effects on treated college cohorts individually. College equals to 1 if one is a college degree
holder. The individual level controls are gender, belonging to the Han people and hukou registration status. Individuals are
classified as unemployed if they don’t have a job and were actively searching for a job in the last three months.
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Table 1.7: The Effects of the Expansion on College Cohorts (Continued)
White Collar Not In the Labor Force
(1) (2) (3) (4)
College 0.297*** 0.334*** -0.271 -0.396*
(0.08027) (0.08247) (0.16325) (0.198)
Graduated from HS between 99 and 01*College -0.158* 0.399*
(0.07633) (0.16154)
Graduated from HS in 01*College -0.279*** 0.670**
(0.07772) (0.20807)
Graduated from HS in 00*College -0.176* 0.497*
(0.07964) (0.19722)
Graduated from HS in 99*College -0.112 0.416*
(0.08235) (0.2)
Graduated from HS in 98*College -0.053 0.362
(0.08413) (0.19462)
Graduated from HS in 97*College -0.0162 0.326
(0.081) (0.19639)
Graduated from HS in 96*College -0.00526 0.318
(0.08767) (0.1963)
Individual Level Controls YES YES YES YES
1st-stage F-statistic 44.7056 17.1354 44.7056 17.1354
Adjusted R-square 0.139 0.144 0.014 0.055
Control Group HS Cohorts 95-98 HS Cohorts 95 HS Cohorts 95-98 HS Cohorts 95
No. of Observations 77320 75864 77320 75864
Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by cohort.
∗p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001
Notes: This table shows the reform’s effects on treated college cohorts individually. College equals to 1 if one is a college
degree holder. The individual level controls are gender, belonging to the Han people and hukou registration status. Workers
are classified as not in the labor force if they are still at school or retired early or haven’t searched for a job for more than three
months.
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Chapter 2
A Dynamic Discrete Choice General
Equilibrium Model of China’s Labor
Market
30
2.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, I employ a diff-in-diff type of empirical strategy to assess the higher education
expansion reform’s effects in the short run, on young workers’ unemployment probability,
labor force participation, wages etc. However, that approach has a couple of caveats. First,
although the 2005 Population Survey data is comprehensive, it can at best be used to inves-
tigate the short-run effects of the expansion reform. A thorough investigation of the labor
market effects of the reform in the long run requires collecting much more detailed data.
Second, although by including cohort fixed effects and other controls, the empirical strategy
in Chapter 1 partially takes into account different labor demand conditions faced by differ-
ent cohorts, it does not take into account general equilibrium effects and cannot be used to
generate counterfactual predictions or do education policy simulations. Third, there exist
unobservables at the province level that are correlated with the expansion intensity. These
unobservables will confound the effects of the reform estimated in Chapter 1.
To overcome the caveats in Chapter 1, in this chapter, I build a finite-horizon dynamic
discrete choice labor market equilibrium model along the lines of Lee and Wolpin (2006). I
innovate by parsimoniously incorporating China’s higher education policy. One’s admission
probability depends on the national admission rate and on proxies for one’s ability, such as
one’s parents’ education percentiles within their cohorts. This model can be used to assess
the long-run effects of the higher education expansion reform while taking into account
general equilibrium effects.
In this model, workers invest in skills by going to school or accumulating work experience.
They rent skills in the labor market and get paid by a skill price. They are forward-looking
and form beliefs on the evolution of skill prices and college admission rate. I also explicitly
model the labor demand side. There is a representative firm that employs both skill-neutral
and skill-biased technologies. In each period, given both types of technologies, and factor
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input prices, it decides how much capital to rent and how much high and low-skill units to
employ.
The model has two novel features. First, low- and high-skill workers have different
state spaces. The college admission rate enters the state space of low-skill workers, as they
never attended college and the evolution of admission rates affects their future option values.
Second, the reform not only directly impacts the admissions process, but also affects workers’
decisions and labor market outcomes through their expectations on the evolution of college
admission rates. The model is able to separate the effects of the reform on labor market
outcomes such as college wage premium, from those coming from technological progress
(both skill-biased and skill-neutral), changes in cohort size, and capital rental prices.
In order to estimate this model, and use it to assess the labor market effects of the
reform in Chapter 3, I assemble a data set that includes repeated cross sections from the
Urban Household Survey (1988-1997), the China Household Income Project (1988-2007) and
the China General Social Survey (2003-2012). I also bring in data from the China Health
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), and aggregate data on GDP, registration for the College
Entrance Exam, cohort size etc. I structurally estimate the model using the Simulated
Method of Moments, and show that the model is able to reasonably match key moments in
the data.
Related Literature
This chapter contributes to the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models (e.g., Heck-
man et al. (1998); Lee (2005); Lee and Wolpin (2006); Dix-Carneiro (2014); Llull (2017)).
The model in this chapter is most related to that of Lee and Wolpin (2006), who construct
and structurally estimate a labor market general equilibrium model that explains the growth
of the U.S. service sector between 1968 and 2000. The model in this chapter has two key
features that differ from theirs. First, to focus on the role of the higher education reform,
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this chapter incorporates the unique features of China’s college admissions process in the
model. As a result, the state spaces of low- and high-skill workers are different by an ag-
gregate state variable: the college admission rate. It only enters the state space of low-skill
workers because the evolution of admission rates affects their future option values directly.
In addition, forward-looking low-skill workers must form expectations on the evolution of
the college admission rates, which adds extra complexity to the solution and estimation of
the model.
This chapter also adds to the literature on the labor market effects of China’s higher
education expansion (e.g., Meng et al. (2013); Li et al. (2014); Li et al. (2016)). Among
these papers, the methodology adopted in Li et al. (2016) is most closely related to that
used in this chapter. Similar to their paper, I model a worker’s human capital as affected by
both education and experience, a key feature emphasized in Li et al. (2016). In contrast to
their model, in which the changing admissions policy is reflected by a net-return-to-education
parameter, I explicitly model the college admissions process and how it changes over time. In
addition, I account for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity of workers. The amount
of skill a given type of worker supplies is endogenously determined. In addition to studying
the evolution of the college wage premium, I also explore how the reform interacts with
the demographics of workers and differentially impacts their discounted lifetime wages—a
margin that is not well understood in the context of China’s higher education expansion.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the background on
China’s higher education system, and Section 2.3 sets up the model. Section 2.4 discusses
the intuition on identification and Section 2.5 describes the data. Section 2.6 outlines the
moments of choice and the estimation strategy. Section 2.7 discusses the estimation results.
Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Background
The Higher Education System of China
The higher education system in China is very different from that of the US. Every year,
those who want to go to college register for the annual College Entrance Exam (CEE)
before receiving information on admissions that year. The Ministry of Education releases
information on how many registered for the CEE and what the planned national admission
quota is months after registration is complete. The quota determines the maximum number
that can be admitted to college that year. How large the quota is depends on the number of
available seats in universities and the government’s anticipation of future demand for high
skill. After taking the CEE, students submit a preference list of schools and compete with
other students based on their CEE scores.
Tuition
Before 1985, no tuition was charged for college students, and some students from low-income
households could receive a monthly subsidy of about 20 yuan. Starting in 1985, China
gradually carried out tuition reforms and started to charge tuition. Between 1989 and 1992,
tuition was around 200 yuan. As China transitioned to a market-driven economy, tuition
started to rapidly increase and reached around 3,000 yuan in 1997 and 4,000 yuan in 2,000.
In recent years, tuition is around 5,000 yuan for most public universities. 1
1Tuition varies across majors, universities and provinces. For majors such as Medicine, the tuition is
slightly higher (about 5,000-6,000 yuan). Majors in the arts usually charge a much higher tuition; in some
cases, about 10,000 yuan.
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2.3 Model
In this section, I construct a dynamic labor market equilibrium model where workers make
endogenous choices of education and work and the representative firm decides how much
skill and capital to employ. The model is along the lines of Lee and Wolpin (2006). I extend
their model by incorporating two key institutional features of the higher education system
of China. First, the Ministry of Education usually releases information on the maximum
number of college students they plan to admit months after the registration of the College
Entrance Exam (CEE). Thus, the people who want to go to college have to make decisions
before obtaining accurate information on admissions. Since this capacity constraint is always
binding due to the high expected return to college education, determining this admission
quota is equivalent to setting a national admission rate. The admission rate enters my
model as a key aggregate state variable. It reflects the intensity of the higher education
expansion and affects human capital investment decisions through workers’ expectations on
it. In addition, I model the admissions process, which depends on the national admission
rate, proxies of workers’ ability, and shocks. In reality, the admissions process starts one or
two months after the CEE and determines the actual number of people who are admitted to
college that year.
Compared to the literature on dynamic general equilibrium models (Heckman et al.
(1998), Lee and Wolpin (2006) and Dix-Carneiro (2014) among others), the model I build
has two novel features. First, low- and high-skill workers have different state space. The
admission rate only enters the state space of low-skill workers as they never attended col-
lege and the evolution of the admission rate affects their future option value. Low-skill
workers not only have expectations on the evolution of skill prices but also on college ad-
mission rates, through which the policy change affects workers’ decisions and labor market
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outcomes. 2 Second, the model features an admissions process that depends on proxies of
ability and captures changes in the composition of workers. The unobserved shock in the
admissions process reflects factors that are not in the workers’ control during the exam and
the admissions process.
2.3.1 Workers
Workers make education and labor supply decisions. They choose from three alternatives dka
(k = 1, 2, 3) at age a. dka is an indicator that equals to 1 if alternative k is chosen at age a.
l denotes the unobserved ability types (l = 1, 2, 3). I assume there are three ability types.
ωlik denotes the skill endowment of person i who is of type l if he chooses alternative k. ω is
present when the economy starts in this model and is fixed over time. The differences of skill
endowment across different alternatives can be interpreted as i’s comparative advantage.
In terms of preferences, I follow Lee and Wolpin (2006), and assume that the utility of
consumption is additively separable from that associated with labor supply decisions. This
simplifies the worker’s problem tremendously as we can solely focus on labor supply decisions.
Ωat is the information set one has given age a and time t.
The flow utility at age a and calendar time t are:
Ua = U(d
k
a|Ωat) + U(cat) k = 1, 2, 3. l = 1, 2, 3
Alternative 1 (d1a = 1): acquire education
Depending on different stages of education, a worker has to pay tuition t1 for college and
t1+ t2 for graduate school. Going to school before college is assumed to be free.3 To capture
the fact that most people go to school consecutively, I denote by κ1 the cost of returning
2By low-skill workers, I mean they are low-skill at least for some periods when they are in the model
economy, not necessarily always like so. Note that the reform also affects existing high-skill workers indirectly
through the general equilibrium.
3This is to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated but can be relaxed.
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to school if someone didn’t go to school in the previous year. η1t is a transitory preference
shock one has at t.
U(d1at|Ωat) = ωl1 − t11 (Educa ≥ 12)− t21 (Educa ≥ 16) + κ1
(
1− d1a−1,t−1
)
d1a,t + η
1
t (2.1)
Alternative 2 (d2a = 1): work
U(d2at|Ωat) = γ + wjlat j = H, L l = 1, 2, 3 (2.2)
γ is the “non-pecuniary” benefit associated with working. A worker can be either a high-
skill worker (j = H) if he has acquired at least some college education (Educ > 12) or a
low-skill worker (j = L) if he never went to college before (Educ ≤ 12). He rents the amount
of skill s he has in the labor market if he chooses to work and gets paid by rj for every unit
of it. wjis the wage bill a worker of skill type j is paid. The wage bill varies by the worker’s
fundamental type l, age and time.
wjlat = r
j
ts
j
la (2.3)
A worker produces the amount of human capital or skill using an exponential function.
The inputs are his endowment of type l, ωl2, his years of education, and work experience. A
transitory productivity shock η2 also affects his skill production.4
sjla = exp
(
ωl2 + β
j
1Educa + β
j
2Expera + η2a
)
(2.4)
4One concern is that as more and more people are admitted to college, the quality of higher education
might decrease and therefore impedes skill production in college. The teacher-student ratio in two- and
four-year college in part reflects the quality of higher education. Since this ratio decreased modestly from
0.12 in 1998 to 0.1 in 1999 and was steady around 0.06 starting from 2002, the role of education quality is
likely to be limited.
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Alternative 3 (d3a = 1): stay at home
Similar to the education alternative above, to capture the persistent behavior of staying at
home, a fixed benefit κ3 is introduced if a worker chooses to stay at home for two consecutive
years.
U(d3at|Ωat) = ωl3 + κ3d3a−1,t−1d3a,t + η3t (2.5)
The worker’s problem can be formulated as the following dynamic programming problem.
Va (Ωiat) = maxk∈{1,2,3}
{
V ka (Ωiat)
}
(2.6)
V ka (Ωiat) =

U(dkiat|Ωiat) + δEϵ,η,admission
[
Va+1
(
Ωia+1,t+1|Ωiat, dkiat = 1
)]
a < 60
U(dkiat|Ωiat) a = 60
(2.7)
2.3.2 Production
I model the firm’s side parsimoniously using a CES aggregate production function.5 The
representative firm employs three factors: low skill L, high skill H and capital K. α′s are
share parameters. I assume them to be time varying to capture within-sector reallocation of
factors, which can be interpreted as skill-biased technical change. σ and ν govern elasticities
of substitution. Figure 2.1 shows that 1995 and 2002 are two important turning points for
the evolution of wages of different skill groups. Anecdotally, these two years also correspond
to the points when China went through major events. In 1995, China started reforms that
aimed at downsizing the state-owned enterprises (SOE). In 2002, this process was complete.
Moreover, China joined World Trade Organization (WTO).The two turning points I choose
5I also tried a different functional form: Yt = zt [α1tLσt + α2tHσt + (1− α1t − α2t)Kσt ]
1
σ . I find that the
production function I’m using now explains the data better.
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capture the timing of structural transformation in China in a parsimonious way. The log
difference of the aggregate shocks z between two consecutive years is assumed to follow a
AR(1) process.
Yt = zt
{
α1tL
σ
t + (1− α1t)[α2tHνt + (1− α2t)Kνt ]
σ
ν
} 1
σ (2.8)
αkt =

αk0 if t < 1995
αk0 + αk1 (t− 1994) if 1995 ≤ t ≤ 2001
αk0 + 7αk1 + αk2 (t− 2001) if 2002 ≤ t ≤ 2011 (k = 1, 2)
(2.9)
logzt+1 − logzt = φ0 + φ1 (logzt − logzt−1) + ζt+1 (2.10)
2.3.3 Labor Market Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium of this economy is such that all workers maximize their life-time
utility, the representative firm maximizes its profit and all markets clear. For computational
tractability, I assume the prices in the product market and capital market are determined
by the rest of the world.6
First-order conditions of the firm’s problem
∂Yt
∂Ht
= rHt
∂Yt
∂Lt
= rLt (2.11)
∂Yt
∂Kt
= rKt (2.12)
6This assumption is commonly maintained in the literature on dynamic labor market general equilibrium
models (e.g. Lee and Wolpin (2006) for the U.S.; Dix-Carneiro (2014) for Brazil) to avoid having to solve
for capital rental prices endogenously (if the capital market is closed), given that solving for skill prices in
the labor market is already very computationally intensive.
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Labor market clears
Sjt =
60∑
a=16
Nat∑
i=1
sjiat1(skill typei = j) j = H, L (2.13)
SHt = Ht S
L
t = Lt (2.14)
2.3.4 Admissions Process and State Transitions
Admissions Process
Data on test scores that span across many years are not available, I therefore let one’s
admission probability depend on the proxies of one’s ability. I specify the admissions process
as follows.
admit = admt + p1t(PctlOfEducAt16i − E(PctlOfEducAt16i))
+ p2t(PctlOfParentsEduci − E(PctlOfParentsEduci)) + ϵit (2.15)
One’s admission probability admit depends on the nation level admission rate that year,
admt, and how high his percentile is with respect to the mean percentile in the distribution
of age-16 years of education and parent’s education. ϵit is assumed to be mean zero and
uncorrelated with the percentiles. It reflects factors that one cannot control during the
College Entrance Exam (CEE) and forecasting errors when submitting one’s preference list
of schools. p1 and p2 change across years since the importance of the percentiles may vary over
time. This formulation means the unconditional ex-ante probability of admission is equal to
the admission rate, admt. Moreover, conditional on the same percentiles, everyone has the
same probability of getting admitted up to ϵit.7 The deviation from mean percentile variables
7E(admit|PctlOfEducAt16i, P ctlOfParentsEduci) = admt + p1t(PctlOfEducAt16i −
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determine one’s (ability) type and are used as proxies for innate ability that determines test
scores. There is no available information on how diligent one is in preparing for the exam, but
PctlOfParentsEduci partly reflects this to the extent that children from a better educated
family tends to work harder.
Besides information on percentiles, the national admission rate admt plays an important
role. It is defined as the ratio of the number of newly admitted students to both 2-year and
4-year college in year t over the number of people who register for the CEE in the same year.
As described in the background section, the ministry of education determines a quota after
the registration of CEE is complete, which is the maximum number of students who can be
admitted.
Although the most salient feature of higher education expansion in this chapter is the
sharp increase in admission quota starting from 1999, using this quota directly in the model
requires a realistic way of ranking all individuals who want to go to college. It will become
inevitably arbitrary without detailed information on how observed demographics translate
into test scores. Instead, I exploit one important feature of the data and get around this
problem. The admissions capacity constraint is always binding in the data because of the
high expected return to college education. Hence, as long as the model generates moments
that match the number of people who register for the CEE and the national admission rate,
the number of admitted students generated by the model must be equal to the observed
quota as well.8 Thus, I use admission rate in the model instead of the quota.
Another reason why admission rate is favorable over quota as modeling choice is that it is
consistent with the way people aggregate information on admission in reality. The number
of admitted students and that of registration are in terms of millions. It’s very difficult
for people to keep track of these large numbers and form expectations on future quantities.
E(PctlOfEducAt16i)) + p2t(PctlOfParentsEduci − E(PctlOfParentsEduci))
8When doing counterfactual experiments, quota constraint may not be binding and I have to use quota
instead of admission rate.
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Instead, at least anecdotally, most people keep track of admission rates and use it as an
important source of information when evaluating the chance of getting into college.
In reality, the admissions process occurs after people take the CEE and submit their
preference lists of schools. Although one may have some idea on how one is ranked in the
ability distribution, this information is far from perfect. Also, as is pointed out above, factors
that are not in one’s control during the exam and the admissions process make it even more
difficult to predict ex-ante what one’s admission probability is. To be consistent with these
features, in the model, I assume that agents are agnostic as to what p1 and p2 are, they
decide whether to continue with education once their years of education reach 12.9 If they
do, they will enter the admissions process and continue with education for at least one year
if get admitted. If they are not admitted, they will choose their second best option (either
working or staying home). The admissions process can be thought of mimicking the reality
in the following sense. Based on their skill endowment and innate ability, agents take the
exam and submit their preference list of schools. Ex-ante, there’s no guarantee one will get
admitted. But good students tend to have higher probability of admission.
State Transitions
The transition rule of the state variables are as follows:
Work experience evolves deterministically and increases by one if a worker chooses to work
in the previous year. Education evolves stochastically when it’s equal to 12 and otherwise
the same as work experience.
Expera+1 = Expera + d
2
a (2.16)
912 years of education correspond to the completion of high school. According to the Education Statistics
Yearbooks of China, among the exam takers, more than 80% are the ones who are about to graduate from
high school or professional schools. More than 90% of these students are high school students. I allow for
returning exam takers as long as they are not older than 25 and have at least 11 years of education because
regulation-wise, it’s impossible for adults to go back to high school and acquire formal education. I choose
age 25 because the number of people who are older than 25 and take the CEE account for only 0.05% of the
total.
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Educa+1,t+1 =

Educa,t + d
1
a,t if Educa,t ̸= 12
Educa,t + d
1
a,t1(admissiont = 1) if Educa,t = 12
(2.17)
Following the literature (e.g. Lee and Wolpin 2006, Dix-Carneiro 2014), to reduce the
dimensionality of the state space, I adopt an adaptive forecasting rule of skill prices to ap-
proximate rational expectations.10 Note that this does not assume away general equilibrium
effects. Because the ρ′s are not themselves structural parameters but are functions of other
structural parameters of the model. They are estimated such that they are consistent with
the equilibrium prices. Theρ′s can be interpreted as the agents’ beliefs on the evolution of
skill prices. In equilibrium, their beliefs are correct.
logrjt+1 − logrjt = ρj0 + ρj1
(
logrjt − logrjt−1
)
+ ξt (2.18)
For the admission rate, I adopt a different adaptive forecasting rule: qt = qt−1. This is
only relevant to people who have never attended college. They use the admission rate of
last year to forecast future admission rates. I choose this forecasting rule for three reasons.
First, to calculate the admission rate, one needs information on admission quota and the
number of people who register for the College Entrance Exam (CEE). Such information is
only available months after the registration of CEE. Therefore, one has to decide whether
or not one wants to go to college before knowing the admission rate of that year. Second, to
the extent that the number of available seats and the expected return to college education
10As is noted in Lee and Wolpin (2006), in principle, to solve for a rational expectations equilibrium, the
agents should use the whole history of aggregate variables such as skill prices and admission rates (including
all the current and past values) as well as the cross-sectional distributions of all individual state variables
such as education, work experience etc. However, it’s computationally infeasible to take into account all
these things when solving for the equilibrium. Instead, to the extent that the one-period lag of the growth
rate of the skill prices contains information that’s most relevant to determining the current growth rate, we
adopt this simplified forecasting rule. Dix-Carneiro (2014) shows that in his setting, the quantitative results
are not sensitive to this particular specification by comparing the result to a perfect foresight equilibrium.
Such robustness checks require major modifications of the code and the re-estimation of the model, which
takes a long time. I will keep working on it and include the results of the sensitivity checks in the future.
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are similar for adjacent years, the admission quota and the number of registered exam takers
should also be similar. It is thus reasonable for agents to use qt−1 to predict qt. Third, by
modeling the expectations on admission rate in this way, it simplifies a lot the computational
burden, which is already quite heavy.
The resulted state space is as follows:
Ωat = {a, l, j, Educat, Experat, da−1,t−1, qt, rt, rt−1, ηt, ξt}
The distributional assumptions follow standard practice in the literature. η′s are assumed
to be correlated across three alternatives and follow a multivariate normal distribution with
mean zero. η′s are iid across individuals and time. ξ follows a mean zero normal distribution
and is iid across time.11
2.4 Identification
This section provides intuition on identification. Intuitively, the data allow us to tell pa-
rameters apart as long as they don’t move exactly the same set of moments. That is, the
model is identified as long as for any parameter θ, there doesn’t exist another parameter θ′
that moves exactly the same set of moments as θ.
On the production side, the share parameters α′s are directly related to the factor income
shares of low-skill workers and the composite of high-skill workers and capital. The main
source of variation that is used to identify the α′s come from the time series variations in
those inputs. Given the α′s, σ is identified off the relative changes over time in low skill
supply and the composite of capital and high skill supply, whereas ν is identified off the
relative changes over time in high skill supply and capital.
On the worker’s side, tuition costs t1 and t2 are identified by comparing the proportion
11For details on how to solve the model, please see the appendix.
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of individuals who have a college degree or an advanced degree but of different types. Skill
production slope parameters βj1 and βj2 are identified off the variations of education and
work experience by comparing individuals who are of the same skill types but earn different
wages. Given the same skill prices, variation in wages comes from differences in skills. The
returning cost to school, κ1, corresponds to the proportion of individuals who return to
school from work or home. The persistence parameter of the alternative of staying home,
κ3, corresponds to the proportion of individuals who stay at home for consecutive periods.
Lastly, the skill endowment parameters ω′s reflect worker’s comparative advantage associated
with each of the choice alternative. Conditional on the same observables, workers with high
skill endowment for alternative k are more likely to choose it. Therefore, the proportion of
such workers provides information on the magnitude of ω.
In addition, since the admission quota, cohort size, and capital rental rates are taken as
exogenous in the model, variations in these variables are also exogenous from the point of
view of this model. In general, these exogenous variations along with normalizations and
functional form assumptions help achieve the identification of this model.
2.5 Data
This chapter combines multiple sources of data together and this section describes each of
the dataset.
2.5.1 Survey Data
Repeated Cross-Section Data
I use three repeated cross-section datasets from the Urban Household Survey (1988-1997),
the China Household Income Project (1988-2007) and the China General Social Survey
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(2003-2012).12 These data are nationally representative and are the best publicly available
data that span across the years I study. 13
All three datasets provide detailed information on demographics, education, career choice
and earnings and the survey design is comparable to the Current Population Surveys (CPS)
in the U.S. The Urban Household Survey (UHS) data were collected by the China Statistics
Bureau to keep track of the evolution of the socioeconomic conditions of urban Chinese
households. The China Household Income Project (CHIP) tracks the dynamics of income
and expenditure in China. It was carried out by Chinese and international researchers with
the assistance of the China Statistics Bureau.14 The China General Social Survey (CGSS)
is conducted starting from 2003 by researchers from Hong Kong University of Science and
Technology and Renmin university. The goal was to construct a nationally representative
dataset that can be widely used in empirical social science research. 15
Panel Data
The panel data used in this chapter are from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS),
which were collected since 1989 by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at the Chinese
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC).16 Although the survey was designed to
track the health and nutritional status of the population, it provides information on basic
demographics, work experience and earnings and can be used to construct the work history
of the workers.
12Urban Household Survey covers all years from 1988 to 1997. For the periods I study, the China Household
Income Project covers 1988, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2007 and the China General Social Survey covers 2003, 2005,
2006, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012. The CGSS updated its database and included two more years of data (2013,
2015). I plan to extend the period I study to include these years soon.
13The Urban Household Survey data are made available by the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
14For details on the sampling and survey design, see Eichen and Zhang (1993), Li et al. (2008) and Luo
et al. (2013).
15For details on sampling and survey design, see Bian and Li (2014).
16For the period I study, the CHNS covers 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011.
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Main Features of the Data
I restrict the sample to be consistent with the model, where workers enter the economy at
age 16 and exit at 60. After dropping observations with missing values for key variables such
as age and education, I obtain a pooled repeated cross-section sample containing 317,886
observations. Wages are deflated to their 1988 levels using the GDP deflators of China
downloaded from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. 17Among
the data I use, the sampling procedure of the CGSS changed in 2006 and 2008 and infor-
mation on individual weight is not available for most of the years. To make the CGSS data
comparable to the other data, I use a weighting procedure that’s similar to what is used in
the CPS such that the key variables (e.g. the share of people by education category, sex,
stratum) are matched closely to the census (see the Appendix for details). 18
Table 2.1 shows the evolution of employment shares by education category in urban
China. Both the shares of people who are college educated and above and those who have
some college education increase. Following the higher education expansion in 1999, we see
the sharpest increase in the share of people who have at least some college education.
2.5.2 Aggregate Data
The aggregate data used in this chapter are primarily from the online database of the China
Statistics Bureau. The value-added series are readily obtainable from the database. To
calculate the capital rental rates, I first use data on labor income and GDP from the database
to calculate the share of labor income. Then I calculate the ratio of capital income over
capital stock as the capital rental rate.19The cohort size data are collected from the China
17Since GDP is usually deflated using the GDP deflator and wages must be deflated in the same way as
GDP, I choose the GDP deflator. Note that the CPI are slightly higher than the GDP deflators for 1989-2004
and are slightly lower for the rest of the years.
18CGSS 2005, 2006, 2008 are matched to the 2005 population survey. CGSS 2010-2012 are matched to
the 2010 census.
19capital rental rate = (1−labor share)∗real GDPreal capital stock . I follow the argument made in Bai, Qian (2010) and use
the GDP calculated by income approach. Such GDP data reflect the factor income distribution of domestic
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Population Census 1990, 2000, 2010 and the 2005 China Population Survey. In addition, the
data on the registration of the College Entrance Exam and the number of admitted students
are collected from China Education Statistics Yearbooks.
2.6 Estimation
2.6.1 Choice of Moments
The model is estimated using the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM). I use three sets of
moments from the survey data: moments on career choice, wage distribution and education
distribution. I also complement these moments with aggregate data such as the time series
of real value-added, capital rental prices, cohort size and the number of newly admitted
students. The data moments I choose are as follows.
• Choice distribution (cross-sectional data from the UHS, CGSS and CHIPS)
1. The proportion of individuals choosing each of the three alternatives by year
(1988–2011), age (16–60)
2. The proportion of individuals choosing each of the three alternatives by year
(1988–2011), and schooling level (three categories: <=12, 13 –15, 16+).
3. The proportion of individuals choosing each of the three alternatives by year
(1988–2011)
• Wage distribution (cross-sectional data from the UHS, CGSS and CHIPS)
1. The mean log real wage by year
2. The mean log real wage by highest grade completed (<=12, 13–15, 16+), year
production and is therefore most relevant for the calculation of capital rental rates in this chapter. The
GDP series are deflated to their 1988 levels using the GDP deflators of China downloaded from the World
Development Indicators database of the World Bank.
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3. The mean log real wage by year, age
4. The variance in the log real wage by education and year.
5. The variance in the log real wage and year.
• Wage distribution (panel data from CHNS)
1. The mean log real wage by work experience (0, 1, 2, 3, 4+ years)
• Schooling distribution (cross-sectional data from the UHS, CGSS and CHIPS)
1. The distribution of highest grade completed (<=12, 13–15, >=16) by year (1988–
2011), age (16–60)
• The number of newly admitted students to college (both 2-year and 4-year) by year
2.6.2 Conditional Type Probabilities
Since the (ability) types are unobserved, we have to estimate the probability of being each
type for each person. Individuals are observed for the first time when they enter the economy
at age 16. To the extent that variations in observed measures of skills at age 16 reveal
information on one’s innate ability, we should let one’s type probability depend on such
observables (or proxies of them). Variables such as years of education, work experience and
gender of a worker when he is first observed are typically included in the literature (e.g. Lee
and Wolpin 2006, Dix-Carneiro 2014).20 In China, workers can start to work legally at age
16. Hence, at the beginning of age 16, everyone has zero work experience. For the purpose
of this chapter, I need observables other than years of education at 16 to better capture the
heterogeneity in innate ability.
20In Lee and Wolpin (2006), workers are first observed when they are 16. Therefore, work experience is
zero for everyone.
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Since information on common measures of ability such as test scores is not available in
any existing surveys for the time span I study, I exploit the intergenerational features of my
data sets and use information on parent’s years of education. In particular, to control for
the fact that the average years of education increase over time, I calculate the percentile of
one’s parent’s education according to where they are in the distribution of years of education
of their cohort.21 Although the compulsory schooling law was introduced in China in the
mid-1980s, there was still variation in age-16 years of education. To control for the increase
of average age-16 years of education, I also calculate one’s percentile in the distribution of
age-16 years of education among adjacent cohorts.22
I let the type probabilities depend on one’s percentile of age-16 education and the average
of percentiles of one’s parents when one was 16.23 Holding other demographics constant,
being higher in the distribution of years of education at 16 than others suggest a high skill
endowment for education. In addition, parents with higher percentiles are more likely to have
children with high skill endowment. Prior literature (e.g. Keane and Wolpin 1997) shows
that the multinomial choice structure is flexible enough for the estimation of conditional
type probabilities. I assume there are three types (l = 1, 2, 3), and specify the conditional
type probabilities as follows:
Prob(type = l|x01i, x02i)=
exp(pi0l + pi1lx
0
1i + pi2lx
0
2i)
1 +
∑3
j=2 exp(pi0j + pi1jx
0
1i + pi2jx
0
2i)
, l = 1, 2, 3 (2.19)
where x01i = PctlOfEducAt16i, x02i = PctlOfParentsEduci
21Adjacent cohorts are faced with very similar economic conditions and education resources and therefore
comparable. I calculate parent’s education percentiles in the pooled three adjacent cohorts. For instance, if
one’s parent is 40 when he/she is 16, I calculate the parent’s education percentile among the age-39, -40 and
-41 cohorts.
22Although of the same age, depending on what month in which one was born, they may start school
in different years. To accommodate more observations and account for whom one’s competing with when
applying for college, I pool age-15, -16 and -17 cohorts together to calculate the percentile.
23It rarely happens that parents gain more years of education after their children reach 16. Even if they
do, the effects on Children are very limited according to the literature on early childhood development.
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The pi′s will be estimated together with the rest of the parameters of the model. pi01, pi11
and pi21 have to be normalized to zero to guarantee identification of thepi′s.
2.6.3 Estimation of the Admissions Process
There are two ways to estimate the admissions process. In both ways, the admission rate
at year t, admt, is calculated as No. of newly admitted studentsNo. of people registered for the CEE .24One way is to estimate
the admissions process with the model, which means there are three more parameters to
estimate for each year (p1t, p2t and the variance of ϵt). Given that there are 24 years, the
parameters to estimate will increase by 72.25 The other way is to estimate this process
outside the model for each year using available information on the two percentile variables
and whether or not one is admitted. To reduce the burden of parameter search, I adopt the
latter way. Ideally, we need information in the survey on whether and when one registered
for the CEE. However, this information is rarely available. Given that almost all high school
and professional school graduates take CEE and they account for more than 80% of the
registered exam takers, I assume everyone takes CEE when they are just about to graduate
from high school or professional school and look for their admission status based on their
obtained highest degrees.
24We should use the number of newly admitted students instead of the quota because the admissions
process happens after all students take the CEE and submit their preference list of schools. It determines
the actual number of admissions, which might be slightly different from the quota.
25Although I could restrict the parameters to be the same across years, it doesn’t seem to be consistent
with data.
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2.7 Estimation Results
2.7.1 Parameter Estimates
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.2 through Table 2.5.26 Table 2.2 shows the
estimates of preference parameters by the three available options each period. The cost
of attending college is estimated to be about 3200 yuan in 1988 terms, which is about
13000 yuan today. This is comparable to what most public universities charge plus living
cost.27 The extra cost of going to graduate school is about 2000 yuan today. Although some
graduate students get paid by working with their professors, others have to pay for the tuition
themselves. This estimate reflects an average of the extra cost of attending graduate school,
which includes tuition, living cost and the psychic cost due to the pressure of graduating.
Table 2.2 also shows the skill production parameters. βj1 and βj2 measure how efficient
type j is in producing skill using years of education and work experience. High-skill workers is
better than low-skill ones in producing skill using years of education but not work experience.
This does not mean that high-skill workers are not good at on-the-job learning. It’s simply
because they on average accumulate less years of work experience since they stay in school
longer. β2 reflects the average efficiency of on-the-job learning and it’s necessary for low-skill
workers to be good at this to generate enough wage growth since it primarily comes from
the accumulation of work experience.
Table 2.3 reports the estimates for the production function. σ and ν govern the elas-
ticities of substitution of the production factors. Since σ is estimated to be bigger than ν,
the elasticity of substitution between low-skill labor and the composite is higher than that
between high-skill labor and capital. Thus, the estimates suggest high-skill labor is indeed
more complementary to capital than low-skill labor. Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the es-
26To estimate the model, I employ parallel computation using 16 cores on a cluster to improve on speed.
27Most public universities charge around 5000 yuan for tuition and 1000 yuan for dormitory. The average
living cost is around 6000 yuan a year.
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timates for the conditional type probability and the admissions process parameters. Type
3 has the highest endowment in education and work whereas Type 2 has the lowest. In
general, higher percentiles of years of education at 16 and parents education lead to higher
probability of admission.
2.7.2 Goodness-of-Fit
Figure 2.2 shows how the choice distribution the model generates fits the data. The model
does a good job for years before 1997, but not as good for years between 1999 and 2005.
This is partly due to the quality of the data I use for those years. For years before 1998,
I use the UHS data collected by the China Bureau of Statistics. The sampling and survey
design is maintained in a consistent way across years. For years of 1998 onwards, the data
I use are from the CHIP and the CGSS, which were carried out by different research teams
and resulted in more noise in the pooled sample. Figure 2.3 compares how the actual and
the simulated average wages of the high- and low-skill workers evolve. Although there is
some discrepancy, the trend generated by the model tracks that of the data.
2.7.3 Robustness
To address the concern that the parameter estimates may correspond to a local minimum
of the objective function, I use the following way to find the initial guess of the parameters.
Before implementing the search algorithms such as the Nelder–Mead simplex method, I first
specify a grid as fine as possible (100 to 200 points) for each parameter over the possible
range. By iterating on the grid of each parameter, I record the best parameter value in
each round and use it as the preferred guess for the next round until reaching the end.
Although this way doesn’t guarantee finding the minimum of the objective, it is a better
way to come up with a good initial guess that can be used as a input of the search algorithm.
Another upside of this is that the initial guess already reflects information on the shape of
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the objective function and it partially avoids finding different estimates due to the arbitrary
choice of the initial guess. In addition, I use a hybrid search function that combines global
minimum solvers such as Simulated Annealing and local minimum solvers such as Pattern
Search as a cross-check for the results I got using the standard simplex methods.
2.8 Conclusion
To overcome the caveats embedded in the empirical strategy employed in Chapter 1, I build a
dynamic life-cycle model with both labor supply and labor demand side based on the model
in Lee and Wolpin (2006). The model incorporates China’s higher education policy, and
is able to generate counterfactuals and policy simulations taking into account the general
equilibrium effects of the higher education expansion reform. The key novel feature of the
model is that low-skill workers not only have expectations on the evolution of skill prices but
also on college admission rates, through which the policy change affects workers’ decisions
and labor market outcomes.
I also assemble a data set, combining several sources of repeated cross-section data,
panel data and aggregate data. Using such data, I structurally estimate the model using the
Simulated Method of Moments and show that the model is able to reasonably match key
moments in the data.
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Figure 2.1: The Evolution of Mean Wages by Education Group
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of average wages for three education groups: those who have
high school education and below, those who have some college, and those who are college educated.
The data used are from the Urban Household Survey (1988-1997), the China Household Income
Project (1988-2007) and the China General Social Survey (2003-2012). In addition, this figure
shows that 1995 and 2002 are two important turning points for the evolution of wages of different
skill groups.These two years correspond to the points where China went through major events. In
1995, China started reforms that aimed at downsizing the state-owned enterprises (SOE). In 2002,
this process was complete. Moreover, China joined World Trade Organization (WTO).
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Figure 2.2: Goodness-of-Fit of Choice Distribution
Notes: This figure shows how the choice distribution the model generates fits the data. The model
does a good job for years before 1997, but not as good for years between 1999 and 2005. This is
partly due to the quality of the data I use for those years. For years before 1998, I use the UHS
data collected by the China Bureau of Statistics. The sampling and survey design is maintained in
a consistent way across years. For years of 1998 onwards, the data I use are from the CHIP and
the CGSS, which were carried out by different research teams and resulted in more noise in the
pooled sample.
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Figure 2.3: Goodness-of-Fit of Wage Distribution
Notes: This figure shows the goodness-of-fit of the model in terms of the key wage moments. It
compares how the actual and the simulated average wages of the high- and low-skill workers evolve.
Although there is some discrepancy, the trend generated by the model tracks that of the data.
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Table 2.1: Evolution of Employment Shares by Education Category in Urban China
88-90 91-95 96-99 00-03 04-08 09-11
College and Above
Share - 0.050 0.067 0.081 0.094 0.116
Some College
Share - 0.082 0.137 0.179 0.192 0.223
At Least Some College
Share 0.110 0.166 0.204 0.260 0.286 0.340
High School and Below
Share 0.890 0.834 0.796 0.740 0.714 0.660
Pooled Sample
Female 0.507 0.505 0.508 0.509 0.510 0.504
Observations 119159 125893 37013 19561 6947 9313
Notes: This table shows the evolution of employment shares by education category in urban China.
The data used are from the Urban Household Survey (1988-1997), the China Household Income
Project (1988-2007) and the China General Social Survey (2003-2012). For 1988-1991, the coding
of education category in the UHS does not distinguish between some college and college. Both the
shares of people who are college educated and above and those who have some college education
increase. Following the higher education expansion in 1999, we see the sharpest increase in the
share of people who have at least some college education.
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Table 2.3: Production Function Parameter Estimates
Production Function Parameters
Low-Skill Labor Factor Share
Intercept (before 1995) α10 0.4
(0.036)
Slope 1 (1995-2001) α11 -0.003
(0.0008)
Slope 2 (2002-2011) α12 0.007
(0.0002)
Composite Factor Share
Intercept (before 1995) α20 0.4
(0.065)
Slope 1 (1995-2001) α21 -0.002
(0.0004)
Slope 2 (2002-2011) α22 0.001
(0.0003)
Elasticity Parameters
Low-Skill Labor - Composite σ 0.85
(0.016)
High-Skill Labor - Capital ν 0.4
(0.04)
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the production function parameters. Standard errors are
in parentheses. Please refer to Section 2.7.1 for the discussion on the parameter estimates.
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Table 2.4: Conditional Type Probability Parameters
Endowment Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Education ω11 0.01 ω21 -0.32 ω31 0.25
(0.001) (0.036) (0.015)
Work ω12 0.02 ω22 -0.11 ω32 0.24
(0.004) (0.037) (0.017)
Home ω13 -0.01 ω23 0.04 ω33 -0.46
(0.002) (0.01) (0.051)
Probability Parameters Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Intercept - - pi02 0.697 pi03 -0.111
- - (0.007) (0.005)
Percentiles of Education at 16 - - pi12 0.106 pi13 0.029
- - (0.028) (0.011)
Percentiles of Parents’ Education - - pi22 -1.19 pi23 1.31
- - (0.012) (0.009)
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the conditional type probability parameters. Standard
errors are in parentheses. Please refer to Section 2.7.1 for the discussion on the parameter estimates.
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Table 2.5: Admission Process Parameters
Year 88 89 90 91 92 93
Percentiles of Education at 16 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.42 0.97 1.08
(0.023) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.03) (0.028)
Percentiles of Parents’ Education 0.26 0.37 0.38 0.51 0.49 0.38
(0.08) (0.081) (0.092) (0.093) (0.107) (0.104)
Year 94 95 96 97 98 99
Percentiles of Education at 16 1.53 1.35 1.01 0.92 2.95 2.28
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.03) (0.031) (0.03)
Percentiles of Parents’ Education 0.37 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.43
(0.109) (0.112) (0.103) (0.106) (0.102) (0.102)
Year 00 01 02 03 04 05
Percentiles of Education at 16 2.39 2.71 1.60 1.67 1.42 1.44
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) (0.04) (0.44)
Percentiles of Parents’ Education 0.32 0.44 0.54 0.45 0.43 0.33
(0.1) (0.112) (0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.114)
Year 06 07 08 09 10 11
Percentiles of Education at 16 0.90 2.01 1.03 1.15 0.76 1.88
(0.432) (0.509) (0.705) (0.39) (0.08) (0.056)
Percentiles of Parents’ Education 0.39 0.41 0.62 0.45 0.23 0.37
(0.109) (0.108) (0.127) (0.136) (0.067) (0.072)
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the admission process parameters. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Please refer to Section 2.7.1 for the discussion on the parameter estimates.
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Appendix
Solving the Model
The rich heterogeneity and the general equilibrium feature of the model makes it computationally-
intensive to solve the model. This section describes how the model is solved.
1. Given a set of reasonable model parameters, solve the dynamic programming problem
for each cohort, each age and every possible point in the support of the state space. The
outcome of the first step is a matrix of coefficients that are cohort and age specific. The
coefficients come from a second order polynomial regression that uses contemporary
state variables to predict the Emax function evaluated at the states. The regressors
include a constant, education, experience, ability type dummies, skill prices and ad-
mission rate at t, and all second-order terms such as squares and interactions. The
regression is used to approximate the Emax function, which is the expectation of the
value function at age a with respect to the distributions of unobservables. The model
economy starts in 1988 and ends in 2011 and there are 45 overlapping generations each
year aged from 16 to 60.
2. Solve the model by computing a sequence of equilibrium prices that is consistent with
the model parameters and the beliefs imposed by the forecasting rule.
(a) The following inputs are required for this step: Initial conditions on the state
space distribution, time series of output and capital rental prices from 1988 to
2011. I simulate 1500 people for each cohort starting from 1988. This means for
each year, we have a cross section of 67500 observations. To account for cohort
size variations, I weight each cohort by its cohort size.
(b) Guess a vector of skill prices for 1988. Use this guess, the combinations of states
from (a), simulated shocks to alternatives, guessed forecasting rule parameters
and coefficients obtained from step 1, solve the DPP for everyone alive at 1988
and obtain the choice distribution. Individual choices are then aggregated to
construct the total skill supply of skills for high- and low-skill workers. Given
such skill supply, capital rental prices, output and the model parameters, we can
solve for zt and Kt from the first order condition of capital use (i.e. demand
for capital) and the resource constraint. Applying these solved values to the
first order conditions of high skill and low skill, we can solve for the skill prices.
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These prices are in general different from the initial guess, which means we should
update the guess of skill prices using them. This is done repeatedly for 1988 until
the skill prices solved from the first-order conditions are very close to those used
as the guess.
(c) Repeat (b) for 1989 through 2011 and we can get a time series of skill prices.
These are not yet the equilibrium prices since they are obtained under a set of
guessed belief parameters. To update the beliefs, we need to estimate forecasting
rule as a vector autoregression (VAR) using the time series of skill prices. The
estimates of the VAR then become the updated belief parameters. Repeat (a)
and (b) and keep updating such parameters until they are stable. The stable
belief parameters are then consistent with the equilibrium of the model.
Weighting the CGSS Data
For the weighting to be reasonable, I use the whole sample of the CGSS containing informa-
tion on both rural and urban areas.
1. First weight CGSS 2005-2008 to the 2005 Population Survey, and CGSS 2010-2012 to
the 2010 census by the sex-age-rural/urban-stratum cell. It’s worth noting that the
sampling frame used in 2005-2008 is different from that used in 2010-2012, which affects
the choice of strata. For 2005-2008, the largest strata are Eastern China, Central China
and Western China. For 2010-2012, the largest strata used are the three municipalities
in Eastern China (including Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) and the rest of China.
I match the CGSS to the information in the 2005 Population Survey and the 2010
Census according to the proper divisions of the strata.28
2. On top of Step 1, which matches information by sex-age-rural/urban-stratum cell, this
step matches information by sex-educ-region cell.
(a) I calculate a scale factor such that after multiplying it by the weight constructed
28For the weighting procedure to be reasonable, I must make sure that, within each stratum, the smaller
sampling units are similar in terms of population. This assumption seems less valid for 2010-2012 than for
2005-2008 given the heterogeneity across the rest of China after excluding the three big municipalities in
Eastern China. Although the coding of counties is confidential and a direct check is not feasible, the CGSS
sampling design team conducted factor analysis based on population density, proportion of non-agriculture
population and county GDP per capita for all counties besides the three municipalities. and ranked them.
Moreover, the number of counties were made as similar as possible for all strata (50 in total) before sampling.
This procedure resembles that done for the CPS and was used to make sure the strata as homogeneous as
possible.
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in the first step, the population shares by education category in the CGSS sample
match those in the aggregate data. I can first inflate the aggregate data by the
sampling proportion because the aggregate data is already adjusted by weight so
as to be representative. Thus, everyone represents the same number of people in
the population.
(b) Similar to the first-stage adjustment in the CPS, I count the sample in each
sex-educ-region cell using the weight that I constructed before to inflate it so as
to match the population counts. If the sample cell is under-representative, the
adjustment factor will inflate it, and deflate it otherwise.
adjustment factor of cell j =
population counts in cell j
weighted sample counts in cell j
(c) After applying the adjustment factor, urban, age, female are still generally con-
sistent across years, which is reassuring. These variables are chosen because they
should be stable within a short period of time (5 years).
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Chapter 3
Distributional Consequences of the
Higher Education Expansion in China
and Evolution of the College Wage
Premium: 1988-2011
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3.1 Introduction
In 1999, China launched one of the most massive higher education expansion reforms in
the history of the world. In anticipation of increasing demand for high-skill workers, the
Ministry of Education started to sharply increase the maximum number of students who
could be admitted to college in 1999. Compared to 1998, the number of newly admitted
college students in 1999 increased from about 1 million to 1.5 million. It then kept increasing
in all subsequent years, to 7.2 million in 2014 (Figure 3.1).1 As a result, the supply of high-
skill workers who have at least some college education has been increasing rapidly since
2001 (Figure 3.1).2 In the presence of such a massive expansion of higher education, one
might expect a sizable decline in the college wage premium.3 To the contrary, the college
wage premium had been increasing since 1999 and only started to modestly decrease in
2009 (Figure 3.2). This suggests that strong labor demand-side forces, such as skill-biased
technological progress, is shifting relative demand for high-skill versus low-skill workers.
This chapter investigates the effects of the higher education expansion reform in China
on the college wage premium by disentangling such effects from those resulting from other
forces, such as technological progress, changes in cohort size, and changes in capital rental
prices. In addition, I examine how the reform interacts with the demographics of workers
and affects them differentially. Lastly, I study how long it will take for China to catch up
with developed countries in terms of the share of high-skill workers.
To do so, I make use of the dynamic general equilibrium model constructed in Chapter
2. In this model, workers produce skill by acquiring schooling and accumulating work expe-
1Both 2- and 4-year college students are included. Statistics on admissions are calculated based on data
collected from China Education Statistical Yearbooks.
2Throughout this chapter, I define high-skill workers as those who have at least some college education,
and low-skill workers as those who have finished high school or less. Most 2-year college students who were
admitted in 1999 graduated in 2001.
3The college wage premium is defined as the average wage gap between people who have at least some
college education (high-skill workers) and those who do not (low-skill workers).
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rience, and are paid based on how much skill they supply and their skill types. A worker
becomes high-skill if he has at least some college education. There exists a representative firm
that decides how much of each type of skill and capital to use. I innovate by modeling the
college admissions process. One’s admission probability depends on the national admission
rate and on proxies for one’s ability, such as one’s parents’ education percentiles within their
cohorts. This model is able to separate the effects of the reform on the college wage premium
from those coming from technological progress (both skill-biased and skill-neutral), changes
in cohort size, and capital rental prices. Using the estimated model in Chapter 2, I conduct
several counterfactual and policy experiments and obtain the following main findings.
First, in the presence of post-reform technological progress (both skill-neutral and skill-
biased), the reform increases the college wage premium before 2008 with a diminishing effect,
from about 0.225 log point in 1999 to about 0.025 in 2007. It then starts to decrease the
wage premium from 2008. On average, the reform increases the college wage premium by
18%, with a yearly increment of 0.07 log point. This may seem counterintuitive, as we might
expect the reform to decrease the wage premium holding technological progress the same.
However, in this chapter, wage is defined as a product of the skill price and the amount
of skill one supplies.4 The effect on the college wage premium is therefore determined by
two components: changes in the skill-price gap and changes in the average skill-stock gap.5
Although the reform narrows the skill-price gap between high- and low-skill workers, it
widens the average skill-stock gap, since it allows more low-skill workers, who on average
have more skill to go to college and become high-skill. The sign of the effect depends on
which effect dominates.
In contrast, fixing technological progress at the pre-reform level, I find that the effect of
the reform on the college wage premium is negative and increases over time. On average,
4Heckman et al. (1998) show the importance of distinguishing wage from skill price in human capital
models, as they sometimes move in different directions.
5Throughout this chapter, the gap is calculated as the high-skill workers’ average minus that of the
low-skill workers’.
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the reform decreases the college wage premium by 7% per year. Without post-reform tech-
nological progress, the reform becomes the main factor that affects skill prices.6 Both the
skill-price gap and the average skill-stock gap between high- and low-skill workers are nar-
rowed as a result. The average skill-stock gap narrows because in the absence of post-reform
skill-biased technological progress, the marginal product gap between high- and low-skill
workers converges instead of diverging. Hence, fewer low-skill workers will invest in becom-
ing high-skill. The large number of incoming young and relatively inexperienced high-skill
workers decreases the average skill stock of high-skill workers and narrows the skill-stock
gap. A decomposition of the reform’s net effect on the college wage premium shows that
most of the effect (99%) comes from this narrowing of the average skill-stock gap. This is
because the pre-reform high-skill stock in China was extremely low and the expansion was
massive.
In addition, I find that the higher education expansion reform has differential impacts on
workers in the absence of post-reform technological progress. Cohorts directly affected by
the reform gain the most: about 87% compared to the counterfactual without the reform.
For cohorts that are not directly exposed to the reform, the effect is positive on average, but
is very close to zero for most of them. Cohorts that graduated from high school just a few
years before the reform lose modestly, by 0.15%; This is primarily driven by the more able
ones who are still young enough to be privately efficient to abandon their jobs and go to
college. I also examine the effect on the discounted lifetime wage by treatment group. The
group induced to go to college by the reform (compliers) on average gain the most by 97,164
yuan whereas those who go to college even in the absence of the expansion (always-takers)
lose by 2.6%. They lose because they suffer from the decrease of high-skill price due to the
large increase in the supply of high-skill labor.
Finally, I conduct two policy experiments and show that if China were to continue with
6This is not the only factor, since changes in cohort size and capital rental prices are still present.
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the trends in technological progress and admissions process in 2011, by 2052 China would
catch up with developed countries in terms of the share of high-skill workers in the working-
age population (age 16 - 60). This can be achieved by 2031 if China follows the common
practice of college admissions in developed countries by abandoning the explicit constraint
on admission quotas beginning in 2012. A back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the
latter is worthwhile if the average cost of adding a seat is not greater than 176,000 yuan.
Related Literature
This chapter contributes to two strands of literature. The first examines the evolution
of the college wage premium (e.g., Katz and Murphy (1992); Card and Lemieux (2001);
Goldin and Katz (2008); Lee and Wolpin (2010); Blundell et al. (2018)), and establishes
the importance of various contributing factors, such as skill-biased technological progress,
trade, changes in the female labor force participation rate, etc. These papers examine the
college wage premium in the setting of developed countries. In contrast, this chapter studies
a new setting and contributes to the literature by focusing on a developing country in which
nationwide government interventions and structural transformation are present. In addition
to the factors investigated in prior literature, this new setting allows me to explore how a
large-scale education reform affects the college wage premium.
In addition, this chapter adds to the literature on the labor market effects of China’s
higher education expansion (e.g., Meng et al. (2013); Li et al. (2014); Li et al. (2016)).
These papers study different labor market outcomes and how they are related to higher
education expansion. Although the primary focus of Meng et al. (2013) is how the increase
in the price of unobserved skills could explain the increase in the variance of the earnings
of urban male workers, they attribute, to some extent, the slowing down of the rewards
to both observed and unobserved skills in the early 2000s to higher education expansion.
Li et al. (2014) focus on the effects of the higher education expansion on unemployment,
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and find that the reform increased the unemployment rate of young college graduates. In
contrast, I structurally estimate a labor market general equilibrium model to study the
impact of the higher education expansion reform. The approach I take in this chapter allows
me to disentangle the effects of the higher education expansion reform on the evolution of
the college wage premium from factors such as technological progress (both skill-biased and
neutral), changes in cohort size, and capital rental prices. It also provides a way to conduct
counterfactual and policy experiments that may inform policy making.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 recaps on the model developed
in Chapter 2. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 describe the counterfactual experiments that deliver the
results on the reform’s effects on the college wage premium and its distributional effects,
respectively. Section 3.5 discusses the results of policy experiments. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Model and Goodness-of-Fit
This chapter is based on the estimated model in Chapter 2. There are five forces in the
model that affect the college wage premium: changes in the admissions process (both in
the admission rate and the parameters), changes in the skill-neutral technological progress,
changes in the skill-biased technological progress, changes in capital rental prices and changes
in the sizes of entering cohorts. These forces interact and together explain the changes in
the college wage premium we observe in the data. Although in Chapter 2, I assess the
goodness-of-fit of the model for choice and wage distribution, it’s important to see how well
the model matches the college wage premium since it’s the focus of this chapter. Figure 3.4
shows the goodness-of-fit for college wage premium measured as the average log wage gap.
The log transformation makes the wage premium between 1993 and 1999 look more volatile.
For years between 1999 and 2011, where the model will be used for counterfactual exercise,
the fit is reasonable.
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3.3 Effects of the Higher Education Expansion on the
College Wage Premium
3.3.1 Effects on the College Wage Premium
To get the effects of the higher education expansion on the college wage premium, I use the
estimated model in Chapter 2 as a laboratory and conduct several counterfactual experi-
ments. There are five forces in the model that affect the college wage premium: changes
in the admissions process (both in quota and/or p1t, p2t and σϵ), changes in aggregate pro-
ductivity shock zt, changes in share parameters α1t and α2t, changes in capital rental prices,
and changes in the sizes of entering cohorts. These forces interact and together explain the
changes in college wage premium we observe in the data. In the following sections, I focus
on the effects of the changes in the admissions process while controlling for the other four
forces.
Effect of the Reform in the Presence of Post-Reform Technological Progress
To understand what the trend in the college wage premium would have been in the absence of
the reform, I simulate a counterfactual in which all the parameters remain the same as their
estimated values except for the admissions process. The admission quota and admissions
process parameters p1t and p2t are fixed at their pre-reform levels in 1998. To the extent
that p1 and p2 only measure how the proxies of one’s innate ability translate into admission
probability, they should only reflect how good one is at taking the College Entrance Exam
(CEE) and submitting their preference list of schools. Therefore, as long as the admissions
policy remains fixed, these parameters should be relatively stable across time and invariant
to changes in technology in the counterfactuals.
One may assume that an alternative way to fix the admissions process is to keep the
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admission rate constant at its 1998 level, since it also reflects the intensity of the reform.
However, the policy instrument the Ministry of Education uses is the quota. In the coun-
terfactual, the number of registered exam-takers won’t be the same as in the data, due to
changes in skill prices. Keeping the admission rate fixed may result in a number of admitted
students that is potentially much different from the planned admission quota. Comparison
of Figures 3.1 and 3.3 suggests that the admission quota is more likely to be a primary
policy instrument, since it is much less volatile. Figure 3.1 shows that before the expansion,
the number of newly admitted students each year increases slowly with very small fluctua-
tions. Figure 3.3 shows more fluctuations in the admission rate, which is primarily driven
by changes in the number of registered exam takers.
In Figure 3.5, the two lines on top show the simulation results. The solid line is the
baseline college wage premium generated by the estimated model, in which all parameters
are the same as their estimated values and the admissions process evolves as it does in reality.
The dashed line with circles (Counterfactual 1) shows the counterfactual trend without the
reform while keeping other factors the same. Since the only difference between the two cases
is the reform, their comparison gives us the effect of the reform (see the solid line in Figure
3.6). The reform increases the college wage premium before 2008 with a diminishing effect
from about 0.225 log point in 1999 to about 0.025 in 2007. It then starts to decrease the
wage premium from 2008. On average, the reform increases the college wage premium by
18%, with a yearly increment of 0.07 log point.
This may seem counterintuitive as we might expect the reform to decrease the wage
premium holding technological progress fixed. However, as will become clear in Section
3.3.2, the effect on the college wage premium is determined by two components: changes in
the skill-price gap and changes in the skill-stock gap. Although the reform narrows the skill-
price gap between high- and low-skill workers, it widens the skill-stock gap since it allows
more low-skill workers who on average have more skill to go to college and become high-skill.
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The sign of the effect therefore depends on which component dominates.
Effect of the Reform in the Absence of Post-Reform Technological Progress
In this chapter, the technological progress is modeled in a “reduced-form” way in the sense
that I do not specify how it depends on other primitives of the model. To the extent that
the amount of high-skill workers in the economy may affect the upgrading and diffusion of
technology, post-reform technological progress may be different in the absence of the reform.
This subsection therefore investigates the effect of the reform on the college wage premium
holding technological progress (both skill-biased and skill-neutral) fixed at the pre-reform
level.
I simulate two counterfactuals, one with the reform carried out as it is in reality (Coun-
terfactual 2) and another without the reform (Counterfactual 3). In the case without the
reform, the admission quota and the admissions process parameters, p1, p2 are fixed at the
1998 level for 1999 onwards. In the other case, the admission quota and the p′s evolve as
they are in reality. In addition, aggregate productivity shock zt and share parameters α1t
and α2t are fixed at their 1998 levels in both cases. The implication is that any technological
progress, reforms or other forms of structural transformation that affect productivity or the
allocation of factors are shut down.
I allow the entering cohort sizes (age-16) to be exactly the same as in the data, because
fertility decisions are already made before 1999.7 Lastly, capital rental rates remain the
same as in the data in both cases, because they are determined by the rest of the world.
Comparing these two cases, any differences in the college wage premium must be due to
changes in the admissions process.
The bottom two lines in Figure 3.5 show the evolution of the college wage premium in
both cases. The dashed line in Figure 3.6 shows the net effect of the reform.8 Without
7The youngest cohort in the simulated economy is 16 in 2011, which means they were born in 1995.
8By net effect, I mean the effect of the reform on the college wage premium in the absence of post-reform
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post-reform technological progress, it becomes clear that the reform depresses the college
wage premium immediately from the start and the effect increases over time to about 0.08
log point. On average, the reform decreases the college wage premium by 7% per year. One
reason why the reform depresses the college wage premium from the start is that the reform
allows some workers who would have worked in the labor market as low-skill workers to go to
college, which decreases the supply of low-skill workers. The skill price of low-skill workers
therefore increases and the skill-price gap shrinks. In Section 3.3.2, I discuss what drives the
increase of the effect over time.
Interaction between the Reform and Post-Reform Technological Progress
In the presence of post-reform technological progress, the effect of the reform is a combination
of its net effect and its interaction effect with post-reform technological progress. This can
be seen in Figure 3.5. Comparing Counterfactuals 1 and 2 to Counterfactual 3, respectively,
the gap shows the net effect of post-reform technological progress and that of the reform
on the college wage premium. The gap between the baseline and Counterfactual 3 gives
the total effects of both factors, which include their net effects and their interaction effect.
The interaction effect on the college wage premium arises from two facts. First, in general
equilibrium, the skill prices are affected by both the reform and post-reform technological
progress, which in turn affect workers’ human capital investment decisions and how much
skill they accumulate. Second, the college wage premium is determined by changes in both
skill prices and skill stock.
3.3.2 Understanding the Effects of the Reform
To understand what drives changes in the college wage premium, in this section I decompose
such changes into several margins of adjustment. To the extent that wage is a product of
technological progress.
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skill price and the amount of skill one supplies in the labor market, changes in the wage
premium can be decomposed as coming from two main margins: changes in the skill-price
gap and changes in the average skill-stock gap. Such decomposition follows naturally from
the model. The wage premium in this chapter is defined as the average log wage gap of
high- and low-skill workers. A change in this gap is a sum of two pieces: the change in the
skill-price gap and that in the average skill-stock gap.
△Wage premium = △
(∑NH
i=1 log(rHSi)
NH
−
∑NL
j=1 log(rLSj)
NL
)
= △ (logrH − logrL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes in the Skill−Price Gap
+△
(
1
NH
NH∑
i=1
logSi − 1
NL
NL∑
j=1
logSj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes in the Average Skill−Stock Gap
(3.1)
The change in the average skill-stock gap can be further written as a sum of four compo-
nents: changes in the average work endowment gap, changes in the average education gap,
changes in average work experience gap and the difference between the averages of shocks.
The last term should be close to zero if the number of workers is large.
△
(
1
NH
∑NH
i=1 logSi − 1NL
∑NL
j=1 logSj
)
= △
(
1
NH
NH∑
i=1
ωli2 −
1
NL
NL∑
j=1
ω
lj
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes in the Average Work Endowment Gap
+ △ (βH1 Educi − βL1 Educj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes in the Average Education Gap
+ △ (βH2 Experi − βL2 Experj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes in the Average Experience Gap
+η2i − η2j (3.2)
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Understanding the Effect of the Reform in the Presence of Post-Reform Tech-
nological Progress
Figure 3.7 shows the decomposition of the reform’s effect into changes in the skill-price
gap and the average skill-stock gap when there is post-reform technological progress. From
the decomposition, it’s clear that the effect on the college wage premium is determined by
two components: changes in the skill-price gap and changes in the skill-stock gap. Holding
technological progress the same in the baseline and Counterfactual 1, the reform increases
the supply of high skill relative to low skill and therefore narrows the skill-price gap. In
the meantime—allowing low-skill workers—who on average have more skill to go to college
and become high-skill, the reform widens the skill-stock gap. The widening effect becomes
smaller over time, because the reform creates a large and increasing supply of young and
inexperienced high-skill workers. As they enter the labor market, the average skill stock of
high-skill workers decreases, which creates a countervailing effect on the skill-stock gap.
Understanding the Effect of the Reform in the Absence of Post-Reform Techno-
logical Progress
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 show the graphical versions of the two decomposition equations, 3.1 and
3.2. Figure 3.8 shows that changes in the average skill-stock gap drive the net effect of the
higher education expansion reform on the college wage premium. Changes in the skill-price
gap also serve as a force that depresses the college wage premium, but is not the driving
force. Figure 3.9 shows that changes in the education and work experience gaps drive the
changes in the average skill-stock gap. Interestingly, changes in the work-endowment gap
are positive. This is because as the reform allows more workers who are on average with
lower work endowment to go to college, the average work endowment gap widens. Figure
3.10 shows that the widening of this gap is primarily because the average work endowment
of low-skill workers decreases.
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Overall, on average changes in the skill-price gap account for 0.93% of the net effect of the
higher education expansion on the college wage premium, whereas changes in the average
skill-stock gap account for 99.07%. In addition, changes in workers’ composition account
for -9.71% of the net effect. Changes in the average education gap account for 5.61%, and
changes in the average work experience gap account for 103.31%.9
Although one may expect that changes in the skill-price gap drive changes in the college
wage premium, this result shows that for a developing country like China, where the existing
stock of high skill was extremely low (before 1999), massively expanding higher education
narrows the skill-stock gap between low- and high-skill workers. This is primarily due to
young high-skill workers with zero or little work experience entering the labor market. As
the number of such young high-skill workers increases each year, the average skill-stock gap
continues to narrow, which leads to the amplifying negative effect on the college wage pre-
mium. Note that this narrowing effect is also present when there is post-reform technological
progress. However, it does not outweigh the widening effect, because technological progress
makes the option of becoming high-skill much more attractive for low-skill workers.
It is important to distinguish the narrowing of the average skill-stock gap from the
decrease in the average ability of high-skill workers (measured by work endowment ω2).
As Figure 3.9 shows, changes in workers’ composition actually increase the college wage
premium and the effect is small. Overall, changes in the skill-stock gap dominate the reform’s
net effect on the college wage premium for two reasons. First, the stock of high skill was
extremely low in China before the expansion. Second, the reform expands higher education
massively and enables a continuous and increasing large supply of young high-skill workers
with zero or little work experience to enter the labor market each year.
9The three don’t sum up to 1 because in finite sample, the changes in the differences of the average shocks
are not exactly zero.
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3.4 Distributional Effects of the Higher Education Ex-
pansion
The rich heterogeneity built into the model allows me to study how the higher education
expansion affects people with different demographics. The results of this section are based on
the two counterfactuals simulated before on the net effect of the reform.10 Different cohorts
differ in the time when they enter and exit the economy. To assess the consequences of the
higher education expansion on the same basis, I have to simulate every cohort until they exit
the economy at age 60. Since the youngest cohort is age 16 in 2011, I simulate the model
from 1999 to 2055, when the youngest cohort reaches 60. By comparing the outcomes in the
two cases, I can obtain the treatment effect at the individual level.
Although aggregate productivity shock zt and share parameters,α1t and α2t, are fixed at
their 1998 levels, I have to specify how capital rental prices and entering cohort sizes evolve
beyond 2011. I first estimate a VAR based on the data I have. I then take the estimated
process as the evolution rule and simulate future quantities for years beyond 2011.11
logNc,t+1 − logNc,t = c0 + c1 (logNc,t − logNc,t−1) + λt+1 (3.3)
logrK,t+1 − logrK,t = k0 + k1 (logrK,t − logrK,t−1) + µt+1 (3.4)
As for the admissions process in the case with expansion, I let the admissions quota and
p1, p2 be fixed at 2011 level for subsequent years.12 After simulating the economy to 2055,
10It’s important to note that the results of this section are obtained in the absence of post-reform techno-
logical progress. This is because I’m primarily interested in the net effect of the reform alone.
11Cohorts that will enter the economy from 2012 and 2027 are already born in 2011 and I use actual data
for these years. Death rates are very low for the newly born cohorts and I assume they won’t die. The initial
conditions of these new cohorts are unobserved and I assume they are the same as the age-16 cohort in 2011.
12Since I only look at cohorts that are already in the economy in 2011, these assumptions I make in this
section are only going to affect the results of a limited number of cohorts through general equilibrium.
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I calculate the discounted sum of lifetime wages in both cases for all cohorts that are in the
economy from 1988 to 2011. By comparing the two cases, I get the net treatment effects
of the higher education expansion reform on the discounted sum of lifetime wages for each
worker.13
3.4.1 Effects for Different Cohorts
Figure 3.11 shows the effects on the discounted sum of lifetime wages by cohort. Each cohort
is indexed by the year they enter the economy (age 16).
For cohorts 1944 through 1954, the effect is exactly zero, because all of these cohorts
exit the economy before the higher education expansion reform starts in 1999.14 Cohorts
1955 through 1989 overlap with the reform by at least one year. The effect is increasing
in the number of years they overlap, and their gains are close to zero but positive. Not
surprisingly, the cohorts that gain the most are those that experience the higher education
expansion reform when they reach 19 (Cohort 1996 - 2011), which is the first year the
majority complete high school and take the College Entrance Exam (CEE). Cohorts 1996
through 2011, on average, gain by about 87% compared to the counterfactual without the
reform.
It’s worth noting that cohorts 1990 through 1995 actually lose modestly, by 0.15%. This
is primarily driven by returning CEE takers. These cohorts are between 20 and 25 when the
reform starts. For those who are relatively better educated and have higher skill endowment
in work and education, it’s still privately efficient for them to go to college. However, they
have to take the CEE as returning exam takers and give up their jobs if admitted. In
addition, to transition from work to school, they have to pay an extra cost besides tuition.
Although they gain more years of education, they also lose several years of work experience.
13The discount factor used is 0.95.
14For convenience, throughout Section 3.4, I refer to a cohort by the year when they enter the model
economy at age 16.
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Overall, being someone who narrowly makes it to become high-skill in the presence of the
reform does not guarantee more discounted lifetime wages, compared to the status quo of
staying as low-skill in the case without the reform.15
3.4.2 Effects for Different Treatment Groups
Comparing the two counterfactuals, one can also calculate the effects of the higher education
expansion reform on the discounted sum of lifetime wages for different treatment groups:
those who go to college with or without the reform (always-takers), those who are induced
to go to college (compliers), those who are induced to not go to college (defiers) and those
who don’t go to college regardless of the presence of the reform (never-takers).16 Figure 3.12
shows that perhaps not surprisingly, the group that gains the most are the compliers. They
gain, on average, by 97,164 yuan—more than five times what they would have earned as
low-skill workers in the counterfactual without the reform. The gain is particularly large,
because it is calculated off the fraction of the population that is most affected by the reform.17
A high-skill worker not only accumulates more skill and supplies it at a higher skill price,
but is also more efficient in producing skill using years of education. Becoming a high-skill
worker early in life leads to the dynamic accumulation of such benefits and the gains could
potentially be quite large.
As for the group that goes to college with or without the reform (always-takers), they
15Note that although they lose on average compared to the baseline, they still choose their first best in
the case with the reform.
16In the presence of the reform, the skill-price gap between high- and low-skill workers decreases, which
lowers the relative attractiveness of attending college versus not. This pattern strengthens as the reform
persists, and may change the decisions of those who are at the margin of attending college in the absence
of the reform. It’s also important to note that although in general, people who go to college in the absence
of the reform are of higher ability than those who are admitted in the presence of the reform, due to the
randomness in the admissions process, this is only true on average, not necessarily at the individual level.
For a discussion of checking the validity of the monotonicity assumption in the LATE literature, please see
De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2012) and Fiorini and Stevens (2016), among others.
17It’s important to note that discounted lifetime wages are are calculated as the discounted sum at the
first year when one is in the model economy. For cohorts 1988 through 2011, the sum is discounted to age
16. Moreover, the discounted sum is measured in terms of 1988 yuan.
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lose modestly by 2.6% on average. The loss is, in general, increasing in their exposure to the
reform. They lose because they suffer from the decrease in high-skill prices due to the large
increase in the supply of high-skill labor. The group that doesn’t go to college regardless
of the presence of the reform (never-takers) gains modestly, by about 8.7%, because as the
share of low-skill labor decreases, the demand for low-skill labor increases and the skill price
increases.
3.5 Policy Experiments
I conduct two policy experiments in this section. The main rationale for the higher education
expansion is that China is still far lower than the average of developed countries in terms of
the share of high-skill workers in the working-age population. There’s a debate on whether
China should continue to expand higher education. This section aims to address this debate.
In the first policy experiment, I ask when, if China were to continue with the trends in
technological progress and admissions process in 2011, it would catch up with the developed
countries’ average of 30% in terms of the share of high-skill workers in the working-age
population. To do so, I let the admission quota, p1t, p2t, zt, α1t and α2t, be what they should
be for years 1988 to 2011. For years after 2011, I keep them fixed at the 2011 levels. I
simulate entering cohort sizes and capital rental prices as in the last section.
In the second policy experiment, I ask how much sooner, if China were to follow the
common practice of college admissions in developed countries by abandoning the explicit
constraint on admission quota from 2012, it could reach the target of 30%?18 In addition,
what is the maximum cost of adding new seats that makes it worthwhile? To do so, I
simulate a case in which everything is the same as in the first policy experiment, except that
the admission quota is equal to the number of registered CEE takers after 2011. Figure 3.13
18In this case, although there is no capacity constraint on admissions, not every low-skill worker goes to
college because they are subject to tuition cost, the opportunity cost of staying low-skill, and the cost of
returning to school (for those who already graduated from school).
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shows the evolution of the share of high-skill workers over time. In policy experiment 1,
China will reach 30% of high-skill workers in the working-age population in 2052, whereas
in policy experiment 2, China will reach this target in 2031.
Figure 3.14 shows the evolution of GDP in both experiments. Although technological
progress is fixed at the 2011 level, the economy grows as the skill stock increases. However,
growth is not going to last forever, because as the share of high-skill workers increases, the
marginal product of high skill decreases, which depresses demand. In the meantime, the
marginal product of low skill increases will become extremely high as the share of low-skill
labor decreases. At some point, the high-skill labor employed in the economy will be low
enough such that the GDP decreases.
Comparison of trends in the GDP in Figure 3.14 for years between 2011 and 2031 gives the
increase in GDP due to eliminating the capacity constraint on admissions. Policy Experiment
2 shows that not everyone wants to go to college in the absence of the admissions capacity
constraint. Although the expected return of going to college is high, it’s very costly for
workers to abandon their jobs and return to school. In order to admit the additional college
students, more seats have to be created. Using the fraction of GDP in 2011 that the fiscal
budget on higher education accounts for (0.822%), it’s possible to do a back-of-envelope
calculation on the average cost of adding a seat.19 Assuming that China continues with this
fraction, it is worthwhile to accommodate these extra college students as long as the average
cost of adding a seat is not greater than 176,000 yuan.20
19The cost of a seat includes all kinds of resources devoted to a student, such as the average cost of hiring
teachers and staffs, the average cost of building new institutions and purchasing new equipment etc.
20The assumption is that the government behaves exogenously of the model and finances the budget
through a lump-sum tax.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter answers what the effects are of the higher education expansion reform on the
evolution of college wage premium and investigates its distributional effects on the dis-
counted lifetime wages of workers. To achieve this, I use the estimated model in Chapter
2 as a laboratory to conduct several counterfactual experiments. The first set of results
highlights the importance of post-reform technological progress. It shows that the effects of
large-scale higher education reforms on the college wage premium could be different, depend-
ing on whether one takes into account the interaction between the reform and post-reform
technological progress. In the setting of this chapter, in the presence of post-reform tech-
nological progress (both skill-neutral and skill-biased), the reform first increases the college
wage premium and then decreases it. In contrast, in the absence of post-reform technological
progress, I find that the effect of the reform on the college wage premium is negative and
increases over time. Post-reform technological progress plays a role because it alters the
future option value of attending college, such that the composition of low-skill workers who
choose to go to college changes.
The second set of results shows that although the higher education expansion reform has
differential impacts on workers, it increases the discounted lifetime wages for the majority.
Those who are induced to go to college by the reform (compliers) on average gain the most,
whereas those who go to college even in the absence of the expansion (always-takers) lose
a small fraction of their lifetime income, because they suffer from the decrease in high-skill
prices as a result of the large increase in the supply of high-skill labor.
I also use the model to conduct two policy experiments and show that abandoning the
admission capacity constraint would allow China to catch up with developed countries in
terms of the share of high-skill workers in the working-age population much sooner and at a
reasonable cost.
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Figure 3.1: Annual Admitted College Students and Graduates
Notes: This figure shows the time series of the annual admitted college students and college grad-
uates. Both two- and four-year college students are included. The data used are collected from
the China Education Statistical Yearbooks. In the anticipation of increasing demand for high-skill
workers, the Ministry of Education in China started to sharply increase the maximum number of
students that could be admitted to college since 1999. Compared to 1998, the number of newly
admitted college students in 1999 increased from about 1 million to 1.5 million. It then kept in-
creasing for all subsequent years till 7.2 million in 2014. As a result, the supply of high-skill workers
who have at least some college education has been increasing sharply since 2001.
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Figure 3.2: Average Log Wage Gap
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the college wage premium, defined as the average log
wage gap between high- and low-skill workers, from 1988 to 2011. High-skill workers are those who
have at least some college education whereas low-skill workers complete high school or below. The
data used are from the Urban Household Survey (1988-1997), the China Household Income Project
(1988-2007) and the China General Social Survey (2003-2012). Although the higher education
expansion was massive, the college wage premium had been increasing since 1999 and started to
modestly decrease in 2009. This suggests that there exist strong labor demand side forces that shift
the relative demand for high-skill versus low-skill workers. Indeed, on the demand side, between
1997 and 2002, China aggressively privatized the state-owned enterprises (SOE), which potentially
increased the wage gap (e.g. Fleisher and Wang, 2004). In addition, China joined the World Trade
Organization (WTO) at the end of 2001, which could increased the wages of low-skill workers and
eventually those of high-skill workers as more multinational firms enter China.
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Figure 3.3: Annual College Admission Rate
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the annual college admission rate from 1985 to 2014 (both
2- and 4-year colleges are included). The admission rate is calculated as the ratio of the number of
admitted students and the number of people who register for the College Entrance Exam (CEE)
each year. The data used are from the China Education Statistical Yearbooks. Before 1999, the
admission rate was below 40%. It decreased from 1985 to 1991 mainly because the number of
admitted students didn’t change much, but the number of registered exam takers increased due to
increasing expected returns of college education. It then increased in the 1990s for two reasons.
First, the number of admitted students had been slowly increasing. Second, starting in 1990, the
value of the outside option of working in the private sector increased a lot, which decreased the
number of registered exam takers. After 1999, the admission rate fluctuated around 60% and
reached about 75% in recent years.
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Figure 3.4: Goodness-of-Fit of the College Wage Premium
Notes: This figure shows the goodness-of-fit for college wage premium measured as the average
log wage gap. The log transformation makes the wage premium between 1993 and 1999 look more
volatile. For years between 1999 and 2011, where the model will be used for counterfactual exercise,
the fit is reasonable.
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Figure 3.5: The Effects of the Higher Education Expansion on the College Wage Premium
Notes: This figure shows the simulated trends of the college wage premium, defined as the average
log wage gap, in different counterfactuals. The solid line is the baseline college wage premium
generated from the estimated model, where all the parameters are the same as their estimated values
and the admission process evolves as it is in reality. The dashed line with circles (Counterfactual
1) shows the counterfactual trend without the reform while keeping other factors the same. Since
the only difference between the two cases is the reform, the comparison of them gives us the effect
of the reform. The two lines at the bottom (Counterfactual 2 and 3) show the evolution of college
wage premium in the absence of the post-reform technological progress. Without the post-reform
technological progress, it the reform depresses the college wage premium immediately from the
start. Comparing Counterfactual 1 and 2 to Counterfactual 3 respectively, the gap shows the net
effect of the post-reform technological progress and that of the reform on the college wage premium.
The gap between the baseline and Counterfactual 3 gives the total effects of both factors, which
include the net effects of them and their interaction effect.
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Figure 3.6: The Effects of the Higher Education Expansion Reform on College Wage
Premium
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the reform on the college wage premium with or without
the post-reform technological progress. The solid line shows the gap between the baseline and
Counterfactual 1. The dashed line shows the gap between Counterfactual 2 and 3. The effect
of the reform in the presence of the post-reform technological progress: the reform increases the
college wage premium before 2008 with a diminishing effect from about 0.225 log point in 1999
to about 0.025 in 2007. It then starts to decrease the wage premium from 2008. On average, the
reform increases the college wage premium by 18%, with a yearly increment of 0.07 log point. The
effect of the reform in the absence of the post-reform technological progress: without the post-
reform technological progress, it the reform depresses the college wage premium immediately from
the start and the effect is increasing over time till about 0.08 log point. On average, the reform
decreases the college wage premium by 7% per year.
94
Figure 3.7: Decomposing the Effect on College Wage Premium into Changes in the
Skill-Price Gap and the Average Skill-Stock Gap in the Presence of Post-Reform
Technological Progress
Notes: To understand what drives the effect of the reform on the college wage premium when there
is post-reform technological progress, this figure presents the decomposition of the reform’s effect.
The effect is decomposed into changes in the skill-price gap and changes in the average skill-stock
gap. The decomposition shows that the reform’s effect is determined by two components: changes
in the skill-price gap and changes in the skill-stock gap. Holding the technological progress the
same in the baseline and Counterfactual 1, the reform increases the supply of high skill relative to
low skill and therefore narrows the skill-price gap. In the meantime, by allowing low-skill workers
who on average have more skill to go to college and become high-skill, the reform widens the skill-
stock gap. The widening effect becomes smaller over time because the reform creates a large and
increasing supply of young and inexperienced high-skill workers. As they enter the labor market,
the average skill stock of high-skill workers decreases, which creates a countervailing effect on the
skill-stock gap.
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Figure 3.8: Decomposing the Net Effect on College Wage Premium into Changes in the
Skill-Price Gap and the Average Skill-Stock Gap (in the Absence of Post-Reform
Technological Progress)
Notes: To understand what drives the effect of the reform on the college wage premium in the
absence of the post-reform technological progress, this figure presents the decomposition of the
reform’s effect. The effect is decomposed into changes in the skill-price gap and changes in the
average skill-stock gap. The decomposition shows that changes in the average skill-stock gap drive
the net effect of the higher education expansion reform on the college wage premium. Changes
in the skill-price gap also serve as a force that depresses the college wage premium but is not the
driving force.
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Figure 3.9: Decomposing the Net Effect on College Wage Premium into Changes in the
Skill-Price Gap, the Average Work Endowment Gap and the Average Education and Work
Experience Gaps
Notes: This figure shows the further decomposition of the changes in the average skill-stock gap into
changes in the average work endowment gap, changes in the average education gap and changes in
the average work experience gap. The result shows that changes in the average education and work
experience gaps drive changes in the average skill-stock gap. Overall, on average, changes in the
skill-price gap account for 0.93% of the net effect of the higher education expansion on college wage
premium, whereas changes in the average skill-stock gap account for 99.07%. In addition, changes
in workers’ composition account for -9.71% of the net effect. Changes in the average education gap
account for 5.61% and changes in the average work experience gap account for 103.31%.
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Figure 3.10: Comparing the Evolution of Average Work Endowment in Both Cases
Notes: To understand why the changes in the work-endowment gap in Figure 3.9 are positive, this
figure presents the evolution of average work endowment in Counterfactual 2 and 3. As the reform
allows more workers who are on average with lower work endowment to go to college, the average
work endowment gap widens. From the figure, we can see that the widening of this gap is primarily
because the average work endowment of low-skill workers decreases.
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Figure 3.11: Net Effect of the Higher Education Expansion on the Discounted Sum of
Lifetime Wages By Cohort
Notes: This figure shows the effects on the discounted sum of lifetime wages by cohort. Each cohort
is indexed by the year when they first enter the economy (age 16). For cohorts 1944 through 1954,
the effect is exactly zero because all of these cohorts exit the economy before the higher education
expansion reform starts in 1999. For cohorts 1955 through 1989, they overlap with the reform by at
least one year. The effect is increasing in the number of years they overlap, and their gains are close
to zero but positive. Cohorts 1990 through 1995 actually lose modestly by 0.15%. Cohorts 1996
through 2011 gain the most because they are directly exposed to the higher education expansion
reform. The expansion was already carried out when they reached 19, the first year when the
majority of people complete high school and take the College Entrance Exam (CEE). They on
average gain by about 87% compared to the counterfactual without the reform.
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Figure 3.12: Net Effect of the Higher Education Expansion on the Discounted Sum of
Lifetime Wages By Cohort and Treatment Group
Notes: This figure shows the effects of the reform on the discounted sum of lifetime wages by
treatment group. There are four groups in general: people who are induced to go to college by the
reform (compliers), those who go to college with or without the reform (always-takers), those who
are induced to not go to college as a result of the reform (defiers) and those who never go to college
(never-takers). From the figure, we can see that the group that gains the most are compliers. As
for the always-takers, they lose modestly by 2.6% on average because they suffer from the decrease
of the high-skill prices due to the large increase in the supply of high-skill labor. For never-takers,
they gain modestly by about 8.7% because as the share of low-skill labor decreases, the demand
for low-skill labor increases and the skill price increases.
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Figure 3.13: Comparing the Evolution of the Share of High-Skill Workers in Policy 1 and 2
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the share of high-skill workers in the policy experiment
1 and 2. In policy experiment 1, China will reach 30% of high-skill workers in the working-age
population in 2052, whereas in policy experiment 2, China will reach this target in 2031.
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Figure 3.14: Comparing the Evolution of the Output in Policy 1 and 2
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of GDP in policy experiment 1 and 2. Although the
technological progress is fixed at 2011 level, the economy grows as the skill stock increases. However,
growth is not going to last forever because as the share of high-skill workers increases, the marginal
product of high skill decreases which depresses the demand. In the meantime, the marginal product
of low skill increases will become extremely high as the share of low-skill labor decreases. At
some point, the high-skill labor that is employed economy will be low enough such that the GDP
decreases.
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